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This thesis looks at realistic group conflict theory to explain how socioeconomic status 
influences welfare chauvinism. It also introduces the concept of a cost-bearing factor, which 
suggests that individuals who feel like they pay disproportionally for welfare are less willing to 
extend welfare to immigrants, to explain why social spending may influence welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes. The study poses that the effect of socioeconomic status may vary 
depending on a country’s social spending. By using multinomial logistic regression, individual-
level data from the eighth round of the European Social Survey and country-level data from 
OECD are used to look at the relationship between socioeconomic status and social spending 
as predictors for welfare chauvinism. The results indicate that while the effect of socioeconomic 
status is partially conditional upon low social spending, there is no proof that the effect of 
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Since the 1980s, populist radical right parties (PRRP) have been on a rapid rise in Europe. Over 
the past two decades, Europe has seen PRRPs gain enough votes in different countries to serve 
on national parliaments, be part of minority coalitions, and even be a majority leader (Mudde 
2007, p.541; Afonso 2015, p.273-274; Santana et al. 2020, p.289). To explain this phenomenon, 
researchers have studied the rise of PRRPs from a variety of angles. One well-discussed theory 
poses that the nativist arguments of PRRPs often resonate well with the most vulnerable in 
society. It has been reasoned that those who stand to “go without” in terms of employment or 
social benefits are more likely to vote for a PRRP if the party claims to put natives or citizens’ 
need above immigrants. (Greve 2019). The concept of material self-interest, and how it 
influences the vulnerable in society has thus been theorized as a major contributing factor to 
why an individual chooses to vote for a PRRP.  
 However, that social vulnerability would increase the chances of voting for a 
PRRP is a contested conclusion in literature. Several researchers have found that rarely is the 
majority of a PRRP's voter base working-class citizens or the most vulnerable in society (see 
Arzheimer 2016; Brady & Finnigan 2016). The point is especially contested in research 
surrounding welfare chauvinism. The term welfare chauvinism is used to describe a common 
argument of PRRPs, which is that welfare should be restricted on the basis of citizenship or 
nationality. In literature exploring welfare chauvinistic attitudes, the findings of different 
authors contradict each other. On the one side, there are findings that show how the most 
vulnerable in society display more welfare chauvinistic attitudes due to increased competition 
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over social benefits (Mewes & Mau 2012). On the other side, findings show that individuals 
who are themselves in need of welfare, tend to portray more positive attitudes towards welfare 
programs, including those that include immigrants (Brady & Finnigan 2014, p. 35). 
 Material self-interest could also be used to explore the welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes of the higher socioeconomic groups of society. One task of welfare states is to use tax-
funded social contributions to alleviate social and financial inequalities in society (Palme 2006). 
Although varying in size, a part of the revenue that pays for welfare in all countries comes from 
individual taxes, for example, taxes on income or property. As a result, some individuals end 
up paying more in contributions than they receive in social benefits, and vice versa. Research 
has shown that those who feel that they are paying more for welfare than the benefits they are 
receiving, will be less inclined to support the extension of welfare to individuals whom they 
may feel have not contributed to the welfare system (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018; Vadlamannati 
2020). I call this the ‘cost-bearing factor’. Theoretically, this factor is higher in countries that 
spend more on welfare (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018, p.298). However, this point is also contested. 
Researchers have suggested that generally, welfare chauvinistic attitudes are lower in countries 
with egalitarian welfare systems as compared to liberal or conservative systems (Van Deer Val 
et al. 2013).  
In this thesis it is posed that it is possible the variation in findings from research 
on these two predictors for welfare chauvinism; socioeconomic status and welfare spending, 
might be that the two interact with each other and that one is conditional upon the other.  
 
1.2. Aim 
The concept of welfare chauvinism is the basis of this paper. The aim is to contribute to the 
literature by looking at the effect of socioeconomic status and social spending on welfare 
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chauvinism, to both offer a plausible explanation for variation in welfare chauvinistic attitudes, 
but also as to why the results of research on these two predictors vary. However, by looking at 
variation between countries with low and high social spending, I also offer a plausible reason 
for PRRPs success in countries that once seemed unlikely to support them: wealthy, high social-
spending countries. I thus pose the following research questions:  
• How does individuals’ socioeconomic status affect welfare chauvinistic attitudes?  
• How do European countries’ different levels of social spending affect their residents’ welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes? 
• To what extent does a European country’s social spending affect the relationship between its 
residents’ socioeconomic status and welfare chauvinism? 
To answer these questions, several hypotheses are constructed based on previous research.  
Individual data from the eighth round of the European Social Survey (ESS8) from 2016 and 
country-level data from OECD are used in multinomial logistic regressions to test all 
hypotheses.  
1.3. Structure 
The study is structured as follows. The next section contains an extensive examination of 
previous literature, beginning by explaining the concept of welfare chauvinism, followed by 
looking at the two factors which may influence material self-interest, socioeconomic status and 
social spending. Section 3 further explains and specifies my theoretical model and introduces 
the study’s hypotheses. Section 4 introduces the material and method used for the analysis, 
followed by the results in section 5. Section 6 evaluates the results in relation to the literature 
and theory presented in sections 2 and 3. Finally, the paper ends with a conclusion connecting 
the results of the study to the research questions.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2. 1. Welfare Chauvinism 
For the past few years, since the so-called 2015 migration crisis, Europe has seen a large influx 
of migrants. During this same period, PRRPs have won a substantial number of votes in most 
European countries. Initially, researchers categorized the economic policies of these parties as 
overall neo-liberal (Ennser-Jedenasik 2014, p.295). However, upon further investigation, many 
researchers contested this view; among these is Cas Mudde, who in his book Populist Radical 
Right Parties in Europe claims that the argument came from the fact that the European right-
wing populist parties used neo-liberal rhetoric in their youth, but that these were not backed up 
by neo-liberalism in the party-programs (Mudde 2007, p.19). He also claims that since the 
1980s, several right-wing populist parties have had more welfare-friendly attitudes. However, 
as is common for right-wing populist parties, these attitudes come with a restriction of 
nationality. Only citizens or natives of the PRRP’s own country should be privy to the welfare 
of their respective country (Mudde 2007, p.121-122).  
 This nativist conception of the welfare state is sometimes known as welfare 
chauvinism, a term first coined by Jørgen Gol Andersen and Tor Bjørklund in a discussion of 
right-wing populist parties progress in Denmark and Norway. It was then used to describe the 
common arguments of having to prioritize the native old or sick, which are often emphasized 
by these parties. The authors claimed is that PRRPs do not propagate for reduced welfare, but 
that the access to this welfare is conditional on whether the recipient is perceived as being part 
of the native population (Andersen & Bjørklund 1990, p.211-213).  
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However, welfare chauvinism does not necessarily mean the total exclusion of 
immigrants from welfare. Instead, welfare chauvinism could be considered as either nativist or 
nationalistic. Nativism describes the desire to promote the wants and need of the native above 
those of immigrants. In politics, nativist attitudes tend to inspire policy suggestions that are 
restrictive or discriminating towards immigrants. Although it is common for it to be so, nativism 
does not have to be ethnocentric. However, it does require a perception of a firm in-group with 
a hard line towards the outer groups. It might be based on history, religion, ethnicity or race 
(Ridel 2020, p.19-20). Nationalism instead implies loyalty to the nation. Nationalists celebrate 
the uniqueness of their nation and see it as something that needs protection from outside 
influences (Tamir 2019, p.422). Although this sounds similar to nativism, nationalism does not 
have to imply such a hard line between the in- and out-group. In the literature, nationalism has 
often been divided into civic and ethnic variants. Ethnic nationalism refers to the belief that the 
state the nationalist wants to protect, is made from ethnic, historic or cultural ties. Civic 
nationalism refers instead to a belief that the national state is made up of political systems, 
values or ideology that are require protection (Tamir 2019, p.425-426). This division of 
nationalism has been widely criticized as it originally was meant to categorize nationalism of 
whole countries. However, for this paper, it is a valid distinction to make as it might explain 
different types of welfare chauvinistic attitudes on individual levels. Nativism then, which 
resonates with ethnic nationalism, represents a form of welfare chauvinism that is exclusionary 
towards immigrants in absolution; welfare should never be granted to immigrants on the same 
conditions as the native. Welfare chauvinism could instead resonate with civic nationalism, 
where an individual might feel that an immigrant’s access to welfare should be conditional upon 
the immigrant’s ability to adapt and adjust to the system of the receiving country. Thus, once a 
part of said system, they might be counted into the ‘in-group’ and allowed access to welfare.   
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Behind welfare chauvinism’s condition of national belonging, whether nativist or 
nationalistic, is the perception of deservedness; who deserves access to welfare? In a study from 
2006, Wim van Oorschot finds that support for different social programs is based on individual 
perceptions of how deserving the person benefiting from the program is of assistance. He finds 
that across the European countries in his study, elderly people are perceived as most deserving, 
closely followed by sick and disabled persons, then unemployed, and lastly immigrants (Van 
Oorschot 2006, p.37). This idea of deservedness translates into variation in support for welfare, 
and David Brady and Ryan Finnigan find that if a program is perceived to be skewedly – or 
only – beneficial for immigrants, it less likely to gain high support by the majority (Brady & 
Finnigan 2014, p.23). 
 Thus, the perception of deservedness linked with the idea of restricting 
immigrants’ access to welfare is the combination that is the base of welfare chauvinism as a 
concept. Ever since Andersen & Bjørklund first coined the expression, researchers have 
attempted to explain the variation between individuals in welfare chauvinistic attitudes, and this 
thesis attempts to add to that discussion. The following two parts will look at two plausible 
explanations derived from the idea of material self-interest.  
 
2. 2. Material self-interest 
Material self-interest refers to the desire to protect one’s current or future material possessions 
from something that is perceived to be depleting them or to be a threat to them. The following 
section assesses two types of material self-interest found in literature, the effect of 
socioeconomic status and the cost-bearing factor.  
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2.2.1. Socioeconomic status 
When it comes to the concept of socioeconomic status being a factor which influences whether 
or not a person will show welfare chauvinistic tendencies, there are two lines of opposing 
arguments. The first line of argument considers if the impact of immigration will cause those 
with lower income to show higher levels of welfare chauvinism, as benefits become more 
competitive (Greve 2019, p.47). Jan Mewes and Steffen Mau argue that a majority of 
immigrants to European countries usually become a part of the same socioeconomic group as 
the receiving country’s working class. As such, immigrants and people of lower socioeconomic 
status may come to compete for the same jobs. It is also a possibility that an influx of immigrants 
allows employers to offer lower wages, as there is higher competition for the jobs. Therefore, 
natives or nationals of lower socioeconomic status may be less supportive of immigration 
overall (Mewes & Mau 2012, p.122). However, since immigrants tend to join the group with 
lower socioeconomic status, there is also a risk that immigrants may be in greater need of 
welfare than the general population. Native or nationals with lower socioeconomic status may 
therefore perceive immigration as a threat to their chances of receiving welfare benefits. Either 
because those benefits now have to cover more people, or because of a fear of reduced support 
for welfare as costs become higher for the general population. Therefore, Mewes and Mau argue 
that persons of lower socioeconomic status may be reluctant to extend welfare to immigrants, 
and thus be more likely to have welfare chauvinistic attitudes (Mewes & Mau 2012, p.123) 
In contrast, the second line of argument states that those in need of welfare will 
be more likely to support welfare overall, regardless of whether or not that welfare is beneficial 
for immigrants. Therefore, those of lower income or socioeconomic status will show lower 
levels of welfare chauvinism (Breznau & Eger 2016, Brady & Finnigan 2014). In Ursula 
Dallinger’s article, “Public support for redistribution: what explains cross-national 
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differences?” (2010), she studies the overall support for redistribution through social programs. 
Although her study is not about welfare chauvinism, she acknowledges a version of both 
arguments, stating that an economic downturn can lessen overall support for immigration due 
to a decline in real wages, and thus a lack of support of taxes. However, she argues that these 
types of attitudes are only likely for those who have some sort of financial and job security. 
Conversely, for those without such security, an economic downturn combined with an 
economically vulnerable position should result in increased support for welfare programs 
(Dallinger 2010, p.338). Examining the possibility of both arguments on how socioeconomic 
status influences support for welfare, she finds that generally, economic upturns and higher per 
capita GDP lessen support for redistribution through the welfare state (Dallinger 2010, p.340-
342). Thus, Dallinger finds economic vulnerability to be a predictor for higher welfare support.  
 In a study on immigration’s effect on welfare support through the theory of group 
boundaries, Nate Breznau and Maureen A Eger take Dallinger’s result into account but mainly 
find support for the second line of arguments. In their paper, they divide group boundaries into 
three categories based on who is considered to be “in” a group, and who is considered to be 
“out.” What the authors call the exclusive category follows the idea of ethnic citizenship or 
nativism; the “in-group” consists of solely native-born individuals, and this group is likely to 
be less supportive of the welfare state as the number of foreign-born in their country increases. 
The conditionally inclusive category focuses more on the foreign-born’s ability to adapt and 
assimilate into their “new” country and thus resonates with the idea of civic nationalism. The 
“in-group” of this category depends on the perceived deservedness of the foreign-born. The 
inclusive category already looks upon immigrants as part of the “in-group” and their views on 
welfare will therefore not be altered by an increase of immigrants (Breznau & Eger 2016, pp 
196-197). The authors theorize that support for welfare will be lower if offered to immigrants 
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as well as natives, in individuals with exclusive and conditionally inclusive group boundaries 
when compared to those of inclusive group boundaries (Breznau & Eger 2016, p. 196-197). 
They find, however, that individual material security is an important factor. Less access for the 
individual to material security results in increased social risk, and thus higher support for the 
welfare state, while greater access for the individual to material means causes a feeling of 
having more to lose in a high distribution system (Breznau & Eger 2016 p.197). They find that 
in groups that generally display exclusive group boundaries, the negative effect of immigration 
on support for welfare might lessen for those who are in a socioeconomically vulnerable 
situation. However, for those with a higher socioeconomic position in the same category, the 
negative effect of immigration on support for welfare might be stronger (Breznau & Eger 2016 
p.198 & 208). In effect, what they are arguing is that even those who might vote for PRRPs due 
to being generally anti-immigration might be willing to extend social contributions to 
immigrants if they themselves are dependent on welfare.  
 Similar to Breznau & Eger’s results, Brady & Finnigan actively argue against the 
first line of argument on how socioeconomic status’ affect welfare chauvinistic attitudes, which 
states that increased immigration would lessen the support for welfare, in the areas where 
immigration would lead to a higher competition for social benefits. In their study, they find that 
welfare support is actually highest for programs that would theoretically be more competitive 
due to increased immigration, as these are often those that are also necessary for the 
socioeconomically vulnerable natives (Brady & Finnigan 2014, p.34). In what they call the 
“competition-hypothesis,” they claim that within areas of welfare that might become more 
competitive with a large influx of migrants, e.g., unemployment benefits, increased 
immigration is linked to increased support for social programs. As welfare as a resource gets 
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scarcer, the need for it causes more individuals to support government funding of said resource 
(Brady & Finnigan 2014, p. 35). 
 The literature discussed above shows that there has been research that has found 
support for both tracks of the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism. However, 
as far as I have been able to find, there has been a lack of research explaining why these results 
differ. In this study, I pose that it is likely that the reason for these differentiating results is due 
some other factor which may interact with socioeconomic status, and therefore explain the 
results of the opposing line of arguments.  
 
2.2.2. Social spending 
Another factor which may have an influence on material self-interest is social spending. 
Research has suggested that different types of welfare states have varying influence on the 
support for welfare (Larsen 2006, Van der Waal et al. 2013). Welfare states are complex 
entities, part of the economic systems of modern democratic capitalist systems (Garland 2014, 
p.329). As such, the concepts of the welfare state can be difficult to define. What once started 
as state-funded poor-relief during the industrialization era (Freeden 2006, p.31) has evolved in 
varied ways over time. On the most basic level, the welfare state could be defined as having the 
purpose of securing at least a bottom-line welfare for its citizens (Esping-Andersen 1990, p19). 
However, some scholars have argued that this definition is much too narrow to capture the 
complexity of the modern welfare state. In 1990, Gøsta Esping-Andersen published his well-
renowned book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, in which he created a typology for 
the variation of western welfare states based on the concepts of de-commodification and 
stratification. De-commodification refers to the systems used by the welfare state to secure a 
livelihood for citizens who cannot work, such as sick leave, unemployment contributions or 
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parental leave (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.22-23). As such, de-commodification aims at making 
the individual less of a commodity, less dependent on the fluctuations of the labor market. 
Stratification refers the welfare policies that a state chooses to pursue and how they order social 
relations, that is social equality or inequality (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.24). Esping-Andersen 
identified three types of welfare states: 1. The liberal welfare state, characterized by means-
tested social grants, given only to those most in need of them and otherwise private social 
insurance is encouraged. The liberal welfare system, Esping-Anderson argued, resulted in low 
levels of de-commodification, where individuals are dependent on the labor market to survive. 
2. The conservative/corporatist welfare state, which is characterized by generous, but 
conditional, social contributions. With social insurance often tied to employment, and 
emphasizing the male breadwinner model, Esping-Andersen argued that it did little to enhance 
de-commodification or minimize social stratification, as welfare in these countries highly 
depends on employment (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.27). 3. The social democratic state, 
characterized by universalism with high levels of de-commodification and low levels of social 
stratification reached by social spending throughout society, such as healthcare, education, 
elderly care, and childcare (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.27). Based on this categorization, Larsen 
(2006) found that the social democratic regime has proven best at minimizing social inequality, 
which in turn has raised public support for the regime (Larsen 2006).  
Based on Esping-Andersen’s typology and Larsen’s finding, increasing success 
for right-wing populist parties and welfare chauvinist attitudes in the northern, social 
democratic, European states might seem counter-intuitive. These countries that usually have 
large support for a universal welfare state might be assumed to be likely to present more 
solidarity towards immigrants when it comes to access to the welfare state (Van der Waal et al. 
2013, p.176). Indeed, research has found that when following Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s welfare 
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regime categorization (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.26-28), egalitarian (social democratic) 
countries generally held lower welfare chauvinistic attitudes than conservative and liberal 
regimes (Van der Waal et al. 2013, p.176).  However, increasing support for right-wing populist 
parties promoting welfare chauvinistic arguments can be observed in both the Nordic European 
states as well as other states with fairly generous welfare programs (Keskinen 2016, Norocel 
2016). And in contradiction to results finding that welfare chauvinism attitudes are less common 
in egalitarian countries, Krishna C Vadlamannati finds instead that countries with liberal 
welfare states actually have less welfare chauvinistic attitudes than egalitarian ones 
(Vadlamannati 2020).  
 According to several researchers (see Breznau and Eger 2016, Brady & Finnigan 
2014, van Oorschot 2006), welfare chauvinism is, as mentioned above, based on the perception 
of deservedness. Who is deserving of access to different welfare programs? Laurenz Ennser-
Jedenastik suggests and finds support for the deservedness-factor to be largest in countries that 
spend more on social programs (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018). Similar to the way that Brady and 
Finnigan (2014) argue that welfare support will be the lowest for social programs that are 
perceived to be beneficial for immigrants only, Ennser-Jedenastik argues that in countries 
where social spending is higher, the chance of individuals feeling that they’re paying for welfare 
that does not benefit them is higher than in countries that spend less. Specifically, what he 
observes is that for universal and means-tested systems the probability of individuals feeling 
that they are bearing the cost while immigrants benefit is higher than for insurance-based 
systems. He argues that this is due to immigration not having as big of an impact as in universal 
and means-tested systems in regard to how much more of the state-governed revenue is being 
spent (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018, p.298 & 307-309). Vadlamannati argues that there is an 
assumption among voters for PRRPs, asserting that refugee-immigrants seek out states with a 
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more generous social spending, and that the assumption is that refugees are unskilled and will 
become a liability to the welfare state. Vadlamannati states that if costs of immigration are 
higher than economic gains, natives might feel that immigrants (or in her paper, refugees) take 
an unfairly high share of welfare benefits. This effect will be greater in high spending countries 
because the perceived economic loss will more easily seem higher than the perceived economic 
gains in these countries (Vadlamannati 2020, p.1601). His paper, like many others, focuses on 
the idea that a sudden increase in immigration would lead to higher welfare chauvinism in a 
country but finds that this is conditional upon welfare spending and that these attitudes would 
increase the most in high social-expenditure countries. This idea of welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes being linked to how much an individual perceives that they pay for welfare contra how 
much they receive in benefits; I call the cost bearing factor.  
 Similar to the literature on socioeconomic status, the results of research on social 
spending as a predictor for welfare chauvinism is divided. Some research has found that 
individuals living in high spending, egalitarian systems are less likely than others display 
welfare chauvinistic attitudes (Van der Waal et al 2013), Others have found that egalitarian 
systems are instead the most likely to foster welfare chauvinism (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018). 
Other still find that welfare chauvinism is the least likely in liberal systems with low social 
spending (Vadlamannati 2020). However, few studies have offered an explanation for these 
varying results. In the following section, I look at socioeconomic status and social spending as 
predictors for welfare chauvinism from a theoretical perspective and suggest that the reason for 






3.1 Realistic group conflict theory 
As stated, research on socioeconomic status as a predictor for welfare chauvinism is divided. 
One popular theory to explain the first line of argument on the effect of socioeconomic status 
on welfare chauvinism, stating that low socioeconomic status will results in welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes, has been realistic resource conflict theory (Mewes & Mau 2012, p.123). 
The original strand of the theory, introduced by Muzafer Sherif, suggests that competition for 
finite resources lead to conflict between groups with a vested interest in said resources if one 
group gaining the resource results in a loss for the other (Scofield 2010; Jackson 1993, p.398). 
To assess deservedness or right to the resource in question, individuals tend to divide 
themselves and others into an in-group and an outgroup (Jackson 1993, p.397). For example, 
if immigrants tend to end up working in low-skilled jobs in the receiving country, this will 
increase the competition for low-skilled jobs, causing native low-skilled workers to come in 
conflict with immigrants due to scarcity of low-skilled jobs as a resource. This type of reasoning 
is often used to explain the typical PRRP-voter; “young, low-educated male who is either 
unemployed or a manual laborer” (Shehaj et al. 2019 p.3). When applied to welfare, realistic 
group conflict theory suggests that the in-group (natives or citizens) most in need of welfare, 
e.g., poor, unemployed or otherwise dependent on social benefits, will perceive the presence of 
immigrants as hostile if this outgroup requires, or appear to require, welfare assistance. Thus, 
realistic group conflict theory offers an explanation for the first line of argument on how low 
 
 15 
socioeconomic status’ affect welfare chauvinism, based on an increased competition of 
resources. 
However, through controlled experiments, Sherif also found that when two 
groups work together to achieve a common goal or increase the number of resources, this has 
the potential to reduce inter-group conflict and instead foster positive relations and support 
between two groups. (Jackson 1993, p.398). Thus, realistic group conflict theory also offers a 
possible explanation for the second line of argument on socioeconomic status as a predictor for 
welfare chauvinism, stating that economically vulnerable individuals are more likely to support 
extending public welfare to immigrants. Looking at the differentiating results of the research 
on socioeconomic status as a predictor for welfare chauvinism through realistic group conflict 
theory, it could be argued that it is possible that the most vulnerable from the native ‘in-group’ 
in society sees a need to work with the vulnerable from other groups to increase the overall 
number of resources available to all of them. It is, of course, also possible that interaction 
between these two groups increase due to their socioeconomic status, meaning that they might 
work more closely in low-skilled, low paying jobs or reside in low-income areas, etc. Thus, 
inter-group goals and contact are likely to result in lower welfare chauvinistic attitudes for 
persons of lower socioeconomic status.  
While Sherif’s original theory may be used to reason on why socioeconomically 
vulnerable persons may, or may not, have welfare chauvinistic attitudes, it does not do as well 
to explain the welfare chauvinistic attitudes of persons with higher socioeconomic status. In 
1983, Lawrence Bobo expanded on the theory to focus on perceived threats to the in-group, as 
well as actual threats to a person’s own resources. When looking at conflicts about ethnic 
equality and integration between white and black persons in the United States of America, Bobo 
noticed that in addition to conflict arising from individuals feeling that resources they need are 
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becoming scarcer due to increased competition, individuals might also become hostile towards 
the outgroup if they feel that the societal position of the in-group is being threatened. He argued 
that there need not be an actual threat towards an individual’s personal resources, for said 
individual to perceive a threat towards members of the in-group, and thus threat towards the 
overall position of the in-group in society (Bobo 1983). If taking into account Bobo’s expansion 
of the theory to include perceived threats, it is possible that the lack of inter-group goals and 
contact between immigrants and natives or citizens of high socioeconomic status, result in the 
opposite effect of what inter-group contact have between individuals with low socioeconomic 
status and immigrants. Bobo argued that it is not only the conflict over material goods but also 
perceived threats to social status, which might cause inter-group conflicts between an in-group 
and an outgroup. Without the mitigating effect of inter-group relations, persons of higher 
socioeconomic status might only perceive a threat to the native group’s status in society. It is 
then possible that the lack of inter-group relations result in that persons of higher socioeconomic 
status being more likely to perceive immigration as a threat, and therefore exhibit more welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes. Based on this, I expect that the most socioeconomically vulnerable in 
society will have less welfare chauvinistic attitudes than those of higher socioeconomic status.  
• Hypothesis 1: Individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes, than are individuals with lower socioeconomic status.  
3.2 The conditional factor  
The literature review on social spending as a predictor for welfare chauvinism, introduced the 
idea of the cost bearing factor. Research has found that in countries that spend more on welfare, 
those who feel that they might be paying more for welfare than they receive in benefits, will be 
more likely to favor restrictions on said welfare. The effect of this factor should increase as 
social spending does. 
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• Hypothesis 2: Individuals residing in countries with high social spending are more likely to 
display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than are individuals residing in countries with low social 
spending. 
 
However, I acknowledge for both hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2, there was research that argued 
the opposite relationships of what the hypotheses of this thesis suggest. Hypothesis 2 is also 
contradictory to realistic group conflict theory. Contrary to what has been theorized in 
Hypothesis 2, if one were to attempt to explain the link between welfare spending and welfare 
chauvinism based on realistic group conflict theory, the implication would theoretically be that 
high spending countries would display less welfare chauvinistic attitudes than lower spending 
countries. This is due to the fact that welfare as a resource should exist to a higher degree in 
high spending countries, and thus create less competition for it. Therefore, the theory alone 
cannot explain the link between high social spending and welfare chauvinism. 
Figure 1. Theoretical Model 
 
Based on the varying results of the research on socioeconomic status and social 
spending, it is reasonable to assume that the link between both predictors and welfare 
chauvinism is affected by some other factor. I suggest that these two factors are actually 
interlinked. That is, the effect of an individual’s socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes will be conditional on the welfare spending of their country’s government. This 
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relationship is depicted in Figure 1. Based on realistic group conflict theory, I suggest that in 
countries with high social spending it is less likely that individuals with lower socioeconomic 
status will display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than it is for individuals with lower 
socioeconomic status residing in countries with low social spending. This is due to welfare as 
a resource being in less competition in high spending countries. In contrast, in countries with 
low social spending, individuals with lower socioeconomic status will show higher levels of 
welfare chauvinism than individuals with higher socioeconomic status, due to increased 
competition for resources (social benefits), as a result of immigration.  
However, to explain the results of some researchers which state that countries 
with high social spending display more welfare chauvinistic attitudes overall (e.g. 
Vadlamannati 2020), one should also take the cost-bearing factor into account. The reasoning 
behind the cost bearing-factor is that individuals who feel like they pay more than they receive 
for welfare, are less likely to want to expand welfare programs to cover immigrants.  Following 
the reasoning of this factor, I theorize that in high spending countries, it is more likely that 
individuals of higher socioeconomic status, who do not feel like they benefit from welfare, will 
resent paying for the welfare of immigrants. Therefore, individuals of high socioeconomic 
status living in countries with high social spending will be more likely to possess welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes than those of lower socioeconomic status within their country. In 
countries with low social spending, this factor will theoretically be non-existent, or at least have 
less of an effect, as individuals with higher socioeconomic status will pay less for welfare, than 
they would in a country with high social spending.  As such, individuals with high 
socioeconomic status, living in a country with low social spending, who neither feel like they 
are paying, or competing, for welfare will display lower levels of welfare chauvinism than will 
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individuals who do feel like they have to compete for welfare, i.e., those of lower 
socioeconomic status.  
 Thus, I suggest the possibility that the cost-bearing factor, and thus levels of social 
spending, and socioeconomic status interact with each other. In countries with high social 
spending there will be an abundance of welfare as a resource. Following realistic resource 
conflict theory, a plenty of resources should lead to less conflict between groups of lower 
socioeconomic status and immigrants. Therefore, I suggest that individuals with low 
socioeconomic status will not be more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status will. However, as welfare is more extensive, the 
cost for it increases, increasing the effect of the cost-bearing factor. Because of this, I suggest 
that countries with high social spending, individuals with higher socioeconomic status will be 
more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than will those of lower socioeconomic 
status will.  
• Hypothesis 3a: Whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to 
display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status, is 
conditional on the social spending of their country: in countries with high social spending 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes. 
 
I suggest the opposite to be likely in countries with low social spending. Welfare as a resource 
will be scarcer, thus creating a larger conflict for them. The cost-bearing factor will be less in 
these countries as individuals do not pay as much for welfare. Thus, in countries with low social 
spending, individuals of lower socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes, as they need to compete for resources, than individuals of high 
socioeconomic status are.  
 
 20 
• Hypothesis 3b: Whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to 
display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status, is 
conditional on the social spending of their country: in countries with low social spending 




4. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
4.1 Material 
To test the hypotheses listed in section 3, this study uses the eighth round of the European Social 
Survey (ESS8) from 2016 to gauge individual attitudes, and OECD data to measure country-
level indicators (European Social Survey 2016). To account for lagged effects, the variables 
constructed by OECD data uses values from 2015.  
Round 8 of ESS8 was conducted in 23 countries during 2016 and early 2017. Out 
of these 23 countries, Russia has been dropped from this study due to lack of data on country-
level variables in the OECD dataset, as well as Israel since it is not technically a European 
country. That leaves respondents from Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In total, that produces 
an N=39,000. After all variables have been coded to exclude missing or otherwise disruptive 
values, N for all statistic Modelling =34,127.1 
4.1.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is created by ESS8 survey question E15 “When should immigrants 
obtain rights to social benefits/services?”, with response options; 1= “Immediately on arrival”, 
2= “After a year, whether or not have worked”, 3= After worked and paid taxes at least one 
year”, 4= “Once they become a citizen”, and 5= “They should never get the same rights”. The 
 
1 Full ESS8 Survey questions, as well as mean estimations for all variables, can be found in appendix.  
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use of the same question from an earlier round of the European Social Survey (Round 4, 2008), 
as a way to measure welfare chauvinistic attitudes, is well established in the literature (Mewes 
and Mau 2012; Reeskens & Van Oorschot 2012; Van Der Waal 2013). Van Der Waal et al. 
even proclaim it to be the “only internationally comparative dataset containing a measure of 
welfare chauvinism”, of which they know (Van Der Waal et al. 2013, p169). However, different 
studies have disagreed on how to code the responses. Van Der Waal et al. chose to eliminate 
response 4 altogether since it pertains to the legal status of immigrants, which they argue to be 
a separate issue (Van Der Waal et al.2013, p.172). However, as noted by Mewes and Mau, the 
response option does gauge a version of welfare chauvinism (Mewes and Mau 2012, p.131) and 
excluding it could distort the proportions of the replies, thus increase the risk of false inferences. 
Instead, this study follows the coding scheme of ESS8 question E15 applied by Reeskens and 
Van Oorschot, and divide the responses based on inclusion, conditional inclusion and 
exclusionary attitudes. They combine responses 1 and 2, as the second response ‘After a year, 
whether or not have worked’ does not require the immigrant to fulfil a specific condition. Thus, 
the dependent of this study is a categorical variable where the outcomes are coded 1-2= 
‘Unconditional Access’, 3= ‘Conditional upon reciprocity’, 4= ‘Conditional upon Citizenship’ 
and 5= ‘Exclusion from welfare.’ (Reeskens & Van Oorschot 2012, p.125). 
4.1.2 Independent variables 
In order to test hypothesis 1, by measuring the effect socioeconomic status on welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes, the first independent variable is constructed from ESS8 question F21. 
The question asks the respondent how they perceive it is to be living on their current household 
income. The answers are coded so that 1= ‘Finding it very difficult to live on current income’, 
2= ‘Finding it difficult to live on current income’, 3= ‘Coping on current income’ and 4= 
‘Living comfortably on present income.’  Using this specific variable to gauge socioeconomic 
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status ensures two things; First, as it measures the perception of the adequacy of the household’s 
income rather than real values, it is easy to compare respondents across countries without 
having to take into consideration the overall economic situations of individual countries. 
Second, looking at household income rather than individual income is a more accurate way of 
gauging the socioeconomic status of the respondent. While the respondent might have reasoned 
that they might find it difficult to live on their income alone, the combined income of the 
household might allow for it to be easier to cope or even live comfortably. Vice versa is, of 
course, true as well, an individual with an income that would be high enough for individual 
needs might find that the lack of income, or low income, from other members of the household 
results in them finding it difficult to live on the combined household income.  
 The second independent variable, which tests hypothesis 2, is constructed by 
OECD data on social spending (OECD Social Spending 2015)2. An active choice was made to 
not use any types of welfare-state typologies. It could be argued, as history has shown, that the 
welfare state is not a static entity, it evolves and changes over time, and a lot has happened in 
the past thirty years. Retrenchment of the welfare state has been evident in all European states 
to a varying degree since the 1980s. (Bonoli & Palier 2000). The variation of previous research 
attempting to use Esping-Andersen’s typology might vary simply because the welfare states 
have changed, and countries that once fit in one typology no longer do. Some authors have also 
suggested that Epsing-Andersen’s typologies were too generalizing (Sümer 2009, p.22), and 
others have added new categories to account for countries they felt did not fit with the original 
model (Cerami et al. 2008, Ferrera 1996).  Using this typology might therefore not be 
 
2 OECD defines social expenditure as “cash benefits, direct in-kind provisions of goods and services and tax 
breaks with social purposes. To be considered "social", programs have to involve either redistribution of 
resources across households or compulsory participation.” The data only includes public spending, where the 




completely reliable. Therefore, I suggest that social spending is a better way of gauging the 
general quantity of social benefits as a resource available to citizens. It is also a better measure 
for the cost-bearing factor as a higher percentage of GDP being spent on welfare should 
correlate with individuals feeling that more of the personal income they spend on taxes are 
being spent on social benefits.  
Graph 1 depicts the percent of GDP that the countries of this study spend on social 
protection. To facilitate easier interpretation of the results, the variable is grouped after its 25th, 
50th, and 75th percentiles, creating 4 categories coded 1-4: “Low” =1, “Medium Low” =2, 
“Medium High” =3 and High” =4. However, since the last two hypotheses stated in section 3 
specifies high spending, contra low spending countries, the variable is re-coded into 2 dummy 
variables. The first is divided by the 25th percentile, where all values up to the 25 percentile are 
coded 1, and all others = 0. The first dummy variable thus measures low spending countries. 
The second variable is coded so that all values from the 75 percentile and up are coded 1, and 
all below are coded 0. The second dummy variable thus measures high spending countries. The 
division of the 25 and 75 percentiles are visualized in graph 1 by two vertical lines.  
Graph 1. Social spending 
 
Source: OECD 2015 
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The first puts Ireland, Iceland, Lithuania, Switzerland, Estonia and the Netherlands in the 
dummy for low social spending. The second line separates Italy, Belgium, Finland and France 
as the countries that make up the dummy for high social spending.   
The OECD data is not a perfect indicator of welfare spending. It does not account 
for private market solutions or charity organizations. However, it does account for all 
government-funded social spending such as cash benefits or tax breaks for social purposes. For 
this study, the data is sufficient, as the dependent variable gauges when immigrants should have 
the right to the same type of welfare as natives, which indicates that the measure does not ask 
about private solutions or charity. Instead, the focus is on government funded programs and 
benefits.   
 The independent variables are then combined into two interaction variables.  The 
first interaction combines the first independent variable, measuring how well the individual 
perceives that they can live on the current household income, with the dummy variable 
measuring high social spending. The first interaction variable is used to test hypothesis 3a. The 
second interaction combines the first independent variable with the second dummy variable 
measuring low social spending and is used to test hypothesis 3b.  
4.1.3 Control variables 
The variables introduced in this section are meant to either control for competing theories or 
factors that have been established in literature to influence welfare chauvinism or are known 
for affecting individual attitudes.  
 First, the major competing theory to explain welfare chauvinistic attitudes relates 
to increased immigration (Van Der Waal et al. 2013, p.171). In a well-cited work by Alberto 
Alesina and Edward Glaeser, the authors suggest that the major reason for less support for state-
supplied welfare in the United States of America compared to Europe is due to differences in 
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cultural and ethnic homogeneity, where Europe generally have more homogeneity than the US. 
The result of their study show that increased immigration leads to less support for public 
welfare, due to increased ethnic and cultural heterogeneity which results in less solidarity 
between groups in society (Alesina & Glaeser 2004). However, several studies have since 
contested these results, finding no connection, or that the connection between increased 
immigration and reduced welfare-support is conditional upon some other factor (see Breznau 
& Eger 2016; Brady & Finnigan 2014; Soroka et al. 2015; Vadlamannati 2020). However, since 
it is a contested theory, it is important to include a variable to control for the possibility that 
cultural homogeneity has an effect on an individual’s welfare chauvinistic attitudes. For this 
purpose, a variable is created from OECD data on the percentage of foreign-born of the total 
population of a country (OECD Foreign-born population 2015). The variable reports a specific 
value for each country in the study. As the theory suggest that ethnic and cultural heterogeneity 
decreases the support for welfare, I expect that increases in percentage of foreign-born 
population would increase the likelihood for welfare chauvinistic attitudes.  
 Another competing possibility is that anti-immigration attitudes in general will 
increase welfare chauvinistic attitudes.  Individuals who are against immigration overall, may 
see welfare as a resource that should be kept for the native or the citizen. Research has shown 
that there are a few factors which tend to influence anti-immigration attitudes, which in turn 
then may have an impact on welfare chauvinistic attitudes. First, one common theory to explain 
overall attitudes toward immigrants are based on an individual’s perception of them posing a 
cultural threat (Lucassen & Lubbers 2012, p.549). Therefore, a control variable is created from 
ESS8 question B42: “… would you say that [country]’s culture is generally undermined or 
enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? The variable is coded 0-10, where 
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0= “Cultural Life Enriched” and 10= “Cultural Life Undermined”.  I expect that increased 
values of this variable would increase the likelihood of welfare chauvinistic attitudes. 
 Second, there is a well-documented gender gap in the support for PRRP and anti-
immigration attitudes, where women tend to be overall less hostile towards immigrants and less 
likely to vote for PRRP (see Spierings & Zaslove 2015; Immerzeel et al. 2015; Akkerman 
2015). Therefore, a dummy variable measuring gender is created, coded 0= “Female”, 1= 
“Male”. I expect men to be more likely to have welfare chauvinistic attitudes than women. 
 Education is also a common control variable in studies of anti-immigration 
attitudes. Education has been found to influence perceptions of immigrants and ethnic 
minorities, where higher levels of education result in more acceptance of immigrants (Van Der 
Waal 2013, p.172). ESS8 dataset includes an ISCED (International Standard Classification of 
Education) coded variable to measure the highest level of obtained education across countries. 
The values are coded as 1= “less than lower secondary”, 2= “lower-tier upper secondary”, 3= 
“upper tier upper secondary”, 4= “advanced vocational, su-degree”, 5= “lower tertiary, BA 
level”, 6= “higher tertiary education, >= MA level”. The variable is treated as an interval 
variable in the analysis. I expect higher education to decrease the likelihood of welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes.  
 A third common indicator for high anti-immigration attitudes is the area of 
residence of an individual, where it is suggested anti-immigration attitudes that leads to support 
for PRRPs tend to be more common in rural areas than urban areas (Mamonora & Franquesa 
2019, p.711; Förtner et al 2020, p.3-4). As it is possible that these anti-immigration attitudes 
and support for PRRP translates into higher welfare chauvinistic attitudes, a control variable 
measuring location within a country is included. A dummy variable measuring rural residency 
is created from ESS8 question F14: “Which phrase best describes the area where you live”, 
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with the responses 1= “A big city”, 2= “The suburbs or the outskirts of a big city”, 3= “A town 
or small city”, 4= “A country village”, 5= “A farm or a home in the countryside”. 1-3 are coded 
0= “Urban” and 4-5 are coded 1= “Rural”. I expect that living in a rural area will increase the 
likelihood of welfare chauvinistic attitudes.  
 Finally, a control variable measuring age was included. Some researchers have 
found that anti-immigration attitudes increase with age (Chandler & Tsai 2001, p.180). Others 
have found that age decreases the support for egalitarian welfare (van Oorschot 2012, p.34). 
Based on this, I expect that increase in age would increase welfare chauvinistic attitudes. Thus, 
a variable measuring age from 18-100 is included.  
4.2 Method 
The choice of method for this study centers entirely around the dependent variable. As 
mentioned, different studies have pointed at ESS8 being the best or only dataset that contains a 
variable that accurately measures welfare chauvinism. However, as mentioned in the discussion 
above on the dependent variable, researchers have used different methods to analyze this 
categorical variable. The two options are ordered and multinomial logistic regression (Mewes 
& Mau 2012, Van Der Waal 2013, Reeskens & Van Oorschot 2012). The decision for choosing 
one method over the other has been based on the inclusion or exclusion of the dependent 
variable response stating that immigrants should only be granted the same access to welfare 
once they become a citizen.  
 One could make the case that even with this response included, the dependent 
variable follows an order based on how difficult it should be for an immigrant to obtain the 
same rights to welfare. It would then be that ‘Unconditional access’ = not difficult, ‘Conditional 
upon reciprocity’= somewhat difficult, ‘Conditional upon citizenship’ = very difficult, and 
‘Exclusion from welfare’ = impossible. However, the argument for omitting ‘Conditional upon 
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citizenship’ in order to treat the variable as ordered is based on the idea that the word 
‘citizenship’ might have other implications. While Van Der Waal et al. claims that it has legal 
implications that “… addresses the legal status of immigrants – citizens versus non-citizens – 
which is substantially different” (Van der Waal 2013, p.172), I argue that this response, along 
with ‘exclusion from welfare’ might represent two extreme versions of two types of welfare 
chauvinism: nativist or (civic) nationalist. The exclusive response should be interpreted as a 
nativist attitude, where the needs of the native should always be protected over those of the 
immigrant. The ‘conditional upon citizenship’ response could represent a civic nationalistic 
attitude, meaning that once an immigrant is a legal part of the receiving country, it is implied 
that said immigrant has adjusted and adapted to the country’s rules, regulations and system. 
Only then, when they have assimilated to their new society, they are considered as being 
deserving of the same right to welfare as the native. 
 Thus, as I choose to include the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ response, I cannot 
assume the dependent variable to be ordered, and therefore have to treat it as nominal.  As such, 
I have to use a type of logistic regression, and since this study analyses all values of the 
dependent variable, simple logistic regression that treats binary dependent variables was 
excluded. As I have established that I could not treat the dependent as ordered, that leaves 
multinominal regression as the appropriate way to analyze the dependent variable.  
 Logistic regression aims at determining how well an independent variable, or 
variables, predict the odds of an event occurring, the odds of a specific outcome. It uses logged 
odds to model a linear function of the independent variables in a regression (Pollock & Edwards 
2020, p.282). Simply put, the logistic regression coefficient produces a value that predict a 
change in the logged odds of the occurrence measured by the dependent variable, per one-unit 
increase in an independent variable. From this, we can calculate the probability of changed 
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values of the independent variable affecting the outcome of the dependent variable. (Pollock & 
Edwards 2020 p.287-288) Multinomial regression is a simple extension of binary logistic 
regression, which allows for more than two categories, or outcomes, of the dependent variable. 
The method predicts categorical outcome based on the value of the independent variable(s). In 
difference to binary logistic regression, which measures the odds of one of two outcomes, 
multinomial regression estimates the odds of each specific outcome of the dependent variable, 
relative to the odds of falling into a baseline outcome. Here, the baseline outcome is 
‘Unconditional access’.  This outcome represents having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes. As 
the baseline outcome, all coefficients are interpreted as the logged odds of an observation falling 
into this outcome, compared to the specific outcome measured. The coefficient thus reports 
how a variable increase or decrease the likelihood of an individual falling into a welfare 
chauvinistic outcome, relative to the likelihood of falling into the ‘unconditional access’ 




5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Before testing the hypothesis, the data was carefully considered.  
Graph 2. Welfare Chauvinism  
 
Source: ESS8, Weighted data 
As shown by Graph 2 over the dependent variable, measuring welfare chauvinism, a relatively 
small percentage of respondents feel that immigrants never should be granted the same access 
to welfare as persons already living in the respondent’s country of residence. Only 6.973 percent 
falls into this outcome, which could be considered a nativist version of welfare chauvinism. 
The ‘unconditional’ outcome is the second least common response at 19.57 percent. This shows 
that the extreme values are much less common than the conditional categories. The most 
common outcome is ‘Conditional upon reciprocity’, with 47.58 percent of the responses. 
 
3 See appendix for tabulations of dependent and independent variables with row observations and percent. 
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Although this outcome is welfare chauvinistic, reciprocity is the easiest condition to fulfill, and 
should therefore be considered as the weakest of the welfare chauvinistic attitudes. 
Graph 3, over the first independent variable, how respondents feel that they are 
coping on the household income nowadays has low variation, more than 82.8 percent of 
respondents fall into the two highest categories, ‘Coping on current income’, and ‘Living 
comfortably’, and only 17.18 percent in the lowest two categories, ‘Very difficult’, 3.55 
percent, and ‘difficult’, 13.63 percent.  
Graph 3. Living on income 
 
Source: ESS8, Weighted data 
 
Graph 4. Social spending, dummy variables 
 
Source: ESS8  
To test hypothesis 2 and 3, social spending was divided into 2 dummy variables, one measuring 
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the responses of individuals residing in high spending countries compared to all other countries, 
the other measuring the responses of individuals residing in low spending countries compared 
to all other countries. Graph 4 shows that a higher percentage of observations reside in low 
spending countries, with 27.96 percent, as compared to observations residing in high spending 
countries, 21.19 percent.  
 Assessing the variation of responses in the dependent and independent variables 
raised some concerns about running the regression models. The statistical method chosen to 
test all my hypotheses, combined with the inclusion of an interaction term, might result in some 
outcomes and categories ending up with very few observations. For example, the likelihood of 
a person both ending up in the ‘exclusive’ outcome of the dependent variable, the ‘very 
difficult’ outcome of the independent variable, measuring how well the respondent is managing 
on their current income and reside in a high spending country, seemed low. Graph 6 and 7 show 
the distribution of ‘living on income’ on the different outcomes of ‘welfare chauvinism’ 
controlled for the dummy for high social spending, and low social spending respectively.  
Graph 5. Controlled crosstabulations 
 
Source: ESS8, Weighted data 
As shown by the graphs, the ‘very difficult’ value of ‘living on income’ overall generates very 
few observations and the number of observations is further divided by the outcomes of the 
dependent variable, and when controlled for social spending. Likewise, the ‘exclusion from 
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welfare’ generally reports the least observations, especially for observations who are ‘living 
comfortably’ on current income. Therefore, to make sure that that there was indication of at 
least some level of relationship between the interaction variable and welfare chauvinism, some 
controlled cross-tabulations with corresponding Chi-square values are produced to assess the 
effect of statistical significance at the inclusion of an interaction term (Pollock & Edwards 2020, 
p135). 4 The corresponding Chi-square value for all controlled cross tabulations indicate p-
values<.01. These results indicate initial support for the possibility that the relationship between 
socioeconomic status and welfare chauvinism differs depending on a country’s social spending 
and encourages further testing of the hypotheses.  
 
5.2 Multinomial Logistic Regressions 
5.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
In Model 1 and 4 of Table 1, the independent variables are introduced without the control 
variables, which would account for alternative explanations for the variation in welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes. Across Model 1 and 4, the variable ‘living on income’ which measures 
socioeconomic status, reports statistically significant, negative coefficients across all outcomes 
of the dependent variable. These results indicate that increased socioeconomic status decreases 
the logged odds of falling into any of the welfare chauvinistic outcomes as compared to the 
baseline outcome. Thus, when only controlling for social spending, increasing steps in 
socioeconomic status decrease the likelihood of having either of the welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes, compared to the likelihood of having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes. These results  
 
 
4 Full tables with reported frequencies, percentage and Chi2 contributions can be found in the appendix. 
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Table 1. Multinomial logistic regressions 
       Model   Model   Model   Model   Model   Model 
Outcomes of Welfare 
Chauvinism 
Independent variables     1 
   
2 3 4 5 6 
Unconditional 
Access 
(Baseline outcome)       
          
Conditional upon Living on income -.065** .053* .036 -.061** .06** .066** 
Reciprocity     (.028) (.029) (.034) (.028) (.029) (.031) 
 High social Spending -.061 -.144*** -.317    
    (.046) (.047) (.197)    
 Low social spending    -.033 .205*** .466** 
       (.046) (.058) (.206) 
 % Foreign-born pop.  -.031*** -.031***  -.035*** -.035*** 
     (.003) (.003)  (.004) (.004) 
 Immigr. Impact culture  .055*** .055***  .054*** .054*** 
     (.01) (.01)  (.009) (.009) 
 Gender  -.004 -.004  -.001 -.001 
     (.042) (.042)  (.042) (.042) 
 Education  -.107*** -.107***  -.106*** -.106*** 
     (.012) (.012)  (.012) (.012) 
 Living in rural area  .12*** .12***  .109** .109** 
     (.044) (.044)  (.044) (.044) 
 Age  .007*** .007***  .007*** .007*** 
     (.001) (.001)  (.001) (.001) 
 Living on income*High 
soc. spending 
  .055 
(.062) 
   
          
 Living on income*Low 
soc. spending 
     -.079 
(.061) 
          
 Constant  1.126*** .958*** 1.01*** 1.097*** .938*** .92*** 
    (.094) (.134) (.144) (.092) (.134) (.138) 
        
Conditional upon Living on income -.122*** .066** .057 -.133*** .067** .054 
Citizenship    (.03) (.032) (.038) (.03) (.032) (.034) 
 High soc. Spending .011 -.114** -.201    
    (.05) (.051) (.214)    
 Low soc. spending    .413*** .973*** .516** 
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       (.05) (.061) (.232) 
 % Foreign-born pop.  -.095*** -.095***  -.11*** -.11*** 
     (.004) (.005)  (.005) (.005) 
 Immigr. Impact culture  .09*** .09***  .094*** .094*** 
     (.01) (.01)  (.01) (.01) 
 Gender  .117** .116**  .128*** .128*** 
     (.046) (.046)  (.046) (.046) 
 Education  -.109*** -.109***  -.11*** -.11*** 
     (.013) (.013)  (.013) (.013) 
 Living in rural area  .239*** .239***  .214*** .212*** 
     (.048) (.048)  (.048) (.048) 
 Age  .009*** .009***  .009*** .009*** 
     (.001) (.001)  (.001) (.001) 
 Living on income*High 
soc. spending 
  .028 
(.067) 
   
          
 Living on income*Low 
soc. spending 
     .137** 
(.069) 
          
 Constant  .694*** .639*** .667*** .698*** .694*** .731*** 
    (.101) (.147) (.159) (.098) (.147) (.151) 
        
Exclusion from welfare Living on income -.602*** -.189*** -.178*** -.616*** -.191*** -.187*** 
    (.04) (.045) (.054) (.04) (.045) (.047) 
 High soc. Spending .316*** .016 .068    
    (.069) (.073) (.275)    
 Low soc. spending    -.3*** .539*** .717** 
       (.077) (.089) (.29) 
 % Foreign-born pop.  -.111*** -.111***  -.119*** -.119*** 
     (.007) (.007)  (.007) (.007) 
 Immigr. Impact culture  .377*** .377***  .38*** .38*** 
     (.014) (.014)  (.014) (.014) 
 Gender  -.037 -.037  -.032 -.032 
     (.068) (.068)  (.068) (.068) 
 Education  -.32*** -.32***  -.322*** -.323*** 
     (.021) (.021)  (.021) (.021) 
 Living in rural area  .071 .072  .063 .063 
     (.07) (.07)  (.07) (.07) 
 Age  .01*** .01***  .011*** .011*** 
     (.002) (.002)  (.002) (.002) 
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 Living on income*High 
soc. spending 
  -.022 
(.092) 
   
          
 Living on income*Low 
soc. spending 
     -.063 
(.094) 
          
 Constant  .74*** -.79*** -.815*** .907*** -.732*** -.743*** 
    (.124) (.216) (.23) (.122) (.215) (.218) 
        
  Observations 34127 34127 34127 34127 34127 34127 
  Pseudo R2 .007 .048 .048 .008 .051 .052 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses  *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1, Source: ESS8, weighted data
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contradict hypothesis 1, which stated that individuals with higher socioeconomic status would 
be more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than individuals with lower 
socioeconomic status. Instead, the results of Model 1 and 4 indicate that individuals with lower 
socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than are 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status.  
However, once the control variables are introduced, the result of socioeconomic 
status on welfare chauvinism vary over the different outcomes of the dependent variable. In 
Models 2 and 5 the coefficients for socioeconomic status, measured by ‘living on income’ are 
positive in both of the conditional outcomes of welfare chauvinism. Model 1 and 4 shows that 
increasing steps in ‘living on income’ decreases the logged odds of falling into the ‘conditional 
upon reciprocity’ outcome. Conversely, Model 2 and 5 reports coefficients showing increases 
in the logged odds of falling into either of these outcomes with .053 and .06 respectively, per 
one-unit increase in ‘living on income’. These results indicate that increasing socioeconomic 
status increases the likelihood of a respondent falling into ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ 
compared to the likelihood of falling into ‘Unconditional access’. 
The effect of introducing control variables to the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ 
outcome in Models 2 and 5, is mirrored for the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome. The 
coefficient in Model 1 and 4 shows a decrease in the logged odds of falling into this outcome 
compared to the baseline outcome, per one-unit increase in socioeconomic status. In contrast, 
with the introduction of control variables in Model 2 and 5, the coefficient for ‘living on 
income’ reports an increase in the logged odds by .066 and .067 respectively, per one-unit 
increase in socioeconomic status. The results thus show that increasing socioeconomic status 
increases the likelihood of an individual feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare should be 
conditional upon citizenship, compared to feeling that immigrants should be granted 
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unconditional access to welfare. They also indicate that the negative effect of socioeconomic 
status for the conditional outcomes in Model 1 disappears with the introduction of one or several 
of the control variables. 
For the ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome, the coefficient for ‘living on income’ 
remains negative with the introduction of control variables, albeit with a reduced effect 
compared to Model 1 and 4: to -.189 in Model 2, and -.191 in Model 5. The results of Model 2 
and 5 thus indicate that as socioeconomic status increases, the likelihood of falling into 
‘exclusion from welfare’ decreases, as compared to the likelihood of falling into ‘unconditional 
access’. Thus, individuals with higher socioeconomic status are less likely to feel like 
immigrants should be excluded from welfare, compared to feeling that immigrants should be 
granted unconditional access to welfare than are individuals of lower socioeconomic status.  
 While Model 1 and 4 contradict hypothesis 1, the results of Model 2 and 5 gives 
it partial support. The results of the conditional outcomes indicate that persons with higher 
socioeconomic status are more likely to have a conditional welfare chauvinistic attitude, 
compared to having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than persons with lower socioeconomic 
status are. In contrast, individuals with higher socioeconomic status are less likely to have 
exclusionary welfare chauvinistic attitudes, compared to having no welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes, than are individuals with lower socioeconomic status. Thus, only the two conditional 
outcomes of the dependent variable support Hypothesis 1, while the results of the ‘exclusion 
from welfare’ outcome contradict it. As such, Hypothesis 1 cannot be fully accepted in its 
current state. The results do, however, give support for the assumption that the dependent 
variable is not ordered. Instead, the results indicate that there seems to be a distinction between 
the outcomes which need to be explored to explain the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare 
chauvinism. This is further deliberated on in the Discussion section below.  
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5.2.2 Hypothesis 2 
The results for social spending also vary between the models without control variables and the 
models with control variables. Model 1 and 4 introduce the dummy variables for high social 
spending and low social spending, respectively. These are used to test hypothesis 2, which 
stated that individuals residing in countries with high social spending would be more likely to 
display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than individuals residing in countries with low social 
spending. The only outcome category with statistically significant coefficient for social 
spending in both models is ‘exclusion from welfare’. For this outcome, the coefficient for high 
social spending in Model 1 reported a positive coefficient of .316 and the dummy for low social 
spending in Model 4 reported a negative coefficient of -.3. These results indicate that while 
living in a country with high social spending increases the logged odds of falling into ‘exclusion 
from welfare’ over ‘unconditional access’, living in a country with low social spending 
decreases the logged odds of this outcome. This lends some support for hypothesis 2. When 
controlled for socioeconomic status, the results show that individuals living in countries with 
high social spending are more likely to display exclusive welfare chauvinistic attitudes, rather 
than no welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than individuals living in countries with low social 
spending are. However, the dummy for low social spending also report a statistically significant 
coefficient for ‘conditional upon citizenship’ of .413. This indicates that living in a country with 
low social spending increases the logged odds of falling into the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ 
outcome, compared to the ‘unconditional access’ outcome. Thus, in contradiction to hypothesis 
2, the results of Model 4 show that it is more likely for individuals living in countries with low 
social spending to feel like immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon 
citizenship, compared to feeling that immigrants should have unconditional access to welfare. 
Conversely, the results of model 1 indicate high social spending does not seem to affect the 
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likelihood of an individual feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional 
upon citizenship, compared to feeling that immigrants should have unconditional access to 
welfare. 
 However, once again, the effect of these variables alters once control variables 
are introduced. This indicates that effect of social spending is affected by one or several of the 
control variables.5 Looking at Model 2 and countries with high social spending, introducing 
control variables has a remarkable effect. In Model 1, the coefficient for high social spending 
for the conditional outcomes of the dependent lack statistical significance. When control 
variables are introduced in Model 2, both coefficients for the conditional outcomes are 
statistically significant, while the coefficient for ‘exclusion from welfare’ loses its statistical 
significance. For the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ outcome, the coefficient increases in 
strength compared to Model 1, from -.061 to -.144 as well as gaining statistical significance at 
the p<0.01 value. For the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome, the coefficient for high social 
spending changes from having no statistical significance in Model 1, to reporting a value of -
.144, as well as gaining statistical significance at the p<0.05 value. Thus, when control variables 
are introduced, living in a country with high social spending decreases the logged odds of a 
respondent falling into ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ by -.144, and into ‘conditional upon 
citizenship’ with -.114, compared to ‘unconditional access’. That is, living in a country with 
high social spending decreases the likelihood of an individual feeling that immigrants’ access 
to welfare should be conditional, compared to feeling that immigrants should have 
unconditional access to welfare.  
 
5 Full discussion on possible associations between control variables and social spending, along with models that 
test these, can be found in the appendix.   
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  The results of Model 2 do not support hypothesis 2. They instead show that living 
in a country with high social spending decreases the risk of having conditional welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes, while there is no proof that high social spending affects exclusive welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes.  
 Introducing control variables in Model 5, which looks at countries with low social 
spending, also affects the coefficients for social spending. The coefficients for low social 
spending are positive and statistically significant across all outcomes of the dependent variable. 
For the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ outcome, the coefficient for low spending is .205 in 
Model 5, compared to a non-significant coefficient of in Model 4. The coefficient measuring 
low social spending in ‘conditional upon citizenship’ increases from .419 to .973, meaning that 
once control variables are introduced, the effect of living in a country with low social spending 
increase. The coefficient for low social spending in the ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome 
changes direction as compared to the bivariate Model, from -.419 in Model 4 to .539 in Model 
5. Thus, the results of Model 5 show that living in a country with low social spending increases 
the likelihood of a respondent having any of the welfare chauvinistic attitudes as compared to 
favoring unconditional access to welfare for immigrants. This effect is strongest for the 
‘Conditional upon citizenship’ outcome. This is an interesting detail as this outcome for low 
spending countries stood out in the Model 4 as well. Just as stated in the discussion of the results 
of the effect of socioeconomic status there seem to be a distinction between the outcomes which 
need to be explored to explain the effect of low social spending on welfare chauvinism. A 
discussion on this can be found in the Discussion section below.  
 The results of Model 2 and 5 do not support hypothesis 2, that it is more likely 
for individuals living in countries with high social spending to have stronger welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes than for individuals living in countries with low social spending. In fact, 
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the results support the opposite relationship between social spending and welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes. High social spending increases the likelihood of having no conditional welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes. Low social spending, in contrast, increases the likelihood of an individual 
having any welfare chauvinistic attitudes.  
5.2.3 Hypothesis 3a 
Model 3 tests hypothesis 3a: Whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more 
likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic 
status, is conditional on the social spending of their country: in countries with high social 
spending individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status. For this model the 
interaction variable measuring the interaction between socioeconomic status and high social 
spending is introduced. For the conditional outcomes, the coefficients for the interaction 
variable are positive. Usually, a positive value of a coefficient in a multinomial logistic 
regression would indicate that this variable increases the logged odds of a respondent of this 
group falling into the measured outcome as compared to the baseline outcome. However, 
interaction terms are, as always, a little bit more complicated to interpret.  Interaction terms 
must always be analyzed in combination with the coefficients for the variables it is made up of. 
That is, an increase in variable a, equalizes the same increase for the ‘a’ of variable ab. One 
way to interpret an interaction variable is thus to calculate the regression equation of the Model 
where the interaction is included.  The multinomial logistic regression equation looks like this: 
!!" = log 
#!"
#!"	
 = "" +	%!$&", where ‘i’ represents a member of a group (value of independent 
variable), and ‘j’ represents outcome (value of dependent variable) (Rodríguez 2021). The 
equation can be extended to incorporate all variables of a model. By doing so, one can calculate 
the overall prediction of the likelihood of an outcome on the dependent variable, for every value 
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of independent variables or control variables. Another way, and one that makes it easier to 
visualize the results, is to create margins plots based on Model 3, showing the predicted margins 
of an outcome of the dependent variable, at every value of socioeconomic status, for both values 







Source: ESS8, weighted data 
Graph 6 reports the probability of all possible outcomes of the dependent variable, for both 
values of the dummy variable measuring high social spending, at every value of ‘living on 
income’ , which measures socioeconomic status. Model 3 indicates no statistical significance 
for the interaction variable measuring ‘Living on income’ and ‘High Social spending’. 
6a 6b 
6d 
Graph 6. Margins plots over Model 3 
6c 
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However, through the margins plot, we can still look at the predicted outcomes of countries 
with high social spending, contra all other countries. The margins plot also have the benefit of 
reporting the probability of an outcome, irrespective of the probability of falling into any other 
outcome. Therefore, the margins plot does not have to be interpreted in reference to the baseline. 
Thus, a benefit of creating a margins plot for multinomial logistic regression is that one can 
produce the predictive margins for the baseline outcome, as well as all other outcomes. 
Graph 6a shows the margins plot for the ‘unconditional access’ outcome. The 
slopes measuring the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism in countries with 
high social spending differs slightly form the slope measuring the effect of socioeconomic 
status in all other countries. Thus, at first glance, margins plot 6a could seem to indicate that 
the effect of socioeconomic status is conditional upon the social spending of a country. 
However, margins plots also report the 95% confidence intervals (CI) for all values of 
socioeconomic status. If the CI of the slopes at a certain value overlaps, there is no statistical 
significance for the difference between individuals living in countries with high social 
spending, and individuals living in any other country, for that value. As margins plot 6a shows, 
the CI overlaps for all values of socioeconomic status. As such there is no statistical significance 
for the difference in the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism depending on 
the social spending of an individual’s country. Furthermore, both slopes are negative, indicating 
that the direction of the relationship is the same in both countries. It is less likely for individuals 
with higher socioeconomic status to have no welfare chauvinistic attitudes than it is for 
individuals with lower socioeconomic status – regardless of their country’s social spending. 
Hypothesis 3a states that whether or not individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more 
likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic 
status, is conditional on the welfare-spending of their country, where in countries with high 
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welfare spending individuals with higher income are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status. The hypothesis thus also assumes 
that this is true only for countries with high social spending, which indicates the opposite 
relationship for all other countries: in all countries except those with high social spending, 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status will be less likely to have welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status. As such, even if the CI’s did not 
overlap, margins plot 6a does not support hypothesis 3a, as the relationship between 
socioeconomic status and welfare chauvinism would be the same for both countries with high 
social spending and countries with any other social spending.  
 The margins plots for the conditional outcomes, 6b and 6c, indicate similar results 
to the margins plot for ‘unconditional access’. For both outcomes the slope measuring 
socioeconomic status in countries with high social spending differs slightly from the slope 
measuring socioeconomic status in all other countries, indicating that the effect of 
socioeconomic status is conditional upon social spending. However, the difference between 
individuals of lower socioeconomic status and individuals with higher socioeconomic status, is 
small in the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ outcome and barely detectable in the ‘conditional 
upon citizenship’ outcome, indicating at best a minor difference between different categories 
of socioeconomic status, making it unlikely that these differences would be statistically 
significant. Furthermore, for both of the conditional outcomes, both slopes indicate that it is 
more likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic status to have welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes than it is for individuals with lower socioeconomic status. As such, the direction of the 
relationship between socioeconomic status and welfare chauvinism is the same for individuals 
living in countries with high social spending, and individuals living in any other country. 
Therefore, whether or not individuals with higher socioeconomic status will be more likely than 
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individuals with lower socioeconomic status to have either of the conditional welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes, is not conditional upon high social spending. Thus, neither of these 
margins plots support hypothesis 3a. Also, for both outcomes, the CI once again overlaps for 
all values of socioeconomic status, indicating that there is no statistical significance for the 
difference in the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism being dependent on high 
social spending. 
Margins plot 6d over ‘exclusion from welfare’ is the only to indicate a statistically 
significant difference in the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism, between 
countries with high social spending and all other countries. For this outcome, the effect of 
differences in socioeconomic status is greater for individuals living in countries with high social 
spending, than it is for individuals living in any other country. While the results indicate that 
the effect of socioeconomic status is conditional upon social spending, they do not indicate that 
the direction of the effect is conditional upon high social spending. Both the slope measuring 
socioeconomic status in countries with high social spending, and the slope measuring 
socioeconomic status in all other countries, are negative. Thus, regardless of social spending, it 
is less likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic status to feel that immigrants should be 
excluded from welfare, than it is for individuals with lower socioeconomic status. As such, 
margins plot 6d contradicts both stipulations made in hypothesis 3a. Whether or not individuals 
with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to feel that immigrants should be excluded 
from welfare than individuals of lower socioeconomic status, is not conditional upon high social 
spending. Furthermore, margins plot 6d indicate that individuals with lower socioeconomic 
status are more likely to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare, than is 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status.  
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However, the results of margins plot 6d over ‘exclusion from welfare’ have some 
implications for the results of hypothesis 2, which states that it is more likely for individuals 
living in countries with higher social spending to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than it 
is for individuals living in countries with lower social spending. When the interaction between 
socioeconomic status and social spending is accounted for, it is more likely for individuals 
living in countries with high social spending to feel that immigrants should be excluded from 
welfare, than it is for individuals living in any other country. These results are considered with 
the results from testing hypothesis 2 in the discussion section below.  
I hypothesized that whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are 
more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic 
status, is conditional on the social spending of their country: in countries with high social 
spending individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic status. Neither Model 3 nor 
its corresponding margins plot find any evidence for this. The only outcome in which the effect 
of socioeconomic status is conditional upon social spending, is in the ‘exclusion from welfare’ 
outcome. However, in both countries with high social spending and in all other countries, it is 
more likely for individuals with lower socioeconomic status to feel that immigrants should be 
excluded from welfare, than it is for individuals with higher socioeconomic status. As such, the 
direction of the relationship between socioeconomic status and welfare chauvinism is not 
conditional upon social spending. Therefore, although the results indicate an interaction 
between socioeconomic status and social spending, there is no support for hypothesis 3a. 
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5.2.4 Hypothesis 3b 
Hypothesis 3b assumed the opposite relationship of hypothesis 3a. Whether individuals with 
higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than 
individuals with lower socioeconomic status, is conditional on the social spending of their 
country: in countries with low social spending individuals with lower socioeconomic status are 
more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes. To test this, an interaction between ‘living 
on income’ and the dummy for low social spending is introduced in Model 6. To facilitate easier 
interpretation, I once again use margins plots over the predicted margins, for all outcomes of 










r h 7. Margins plots over Model 6 
7c 
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Graph 7, showing the margins plots over Model 6, shows slightly more 
statistically significant results than did the model and graph which included the interaction for 
socioeconomic status and high social spending.  First, if temporarily disregarding the CI, the 
margins plot over the ‘unconditional access’ outcome indicates that it is less likely for 
individuals living in countries with low social spending to feel like immigrants should have 
unconditional access to welfare than it is for individuals who live in any other country. As 
socioeconomic status increases, the probability of feeling that immigrants should have 
unconditional access to welfare decreases, both for countries with low social spending, and all 
other countries. There is no variance in the difference between countries with low social 
spending and all other countries across the values of socioeconomic status. Thus, the effect of 
social spending is not conditional upon low social spending, meaning there is no interaction 
between socioeconomic status and social spending. Also, regarding the CI, at all values of 
socioeconomic status the CI overlaps, indicating that there are no statistically significant 
differences in the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism between countries with 
low social spending and all other countries. 
 Second, for the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ outcome, Model 6 reports that the 
coefficient for the interaction variable is not statistically significant at the p<.1 value. However, 
margins plot 7b indicate statistically significant differences between countries with low social 
spending and all others, for the two highest groups of socioeconomic status. Although there 
was no statistical difference between the two lowest values of socioeconomic status, margins 
plot 7b indicate that the high levels of socioeconomic status in countries with low social 
spending, decreases the probability of an individual feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare 
should be conditional upon reciprocity. In contrast, high levels of socioeconomic status in any 
other country increase the probability of an individual feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare 
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should be conditional upon reciprocity. As such, it is more likely for an individual living in a 
country with low social spending to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be 
conditional upon reciprocity if they have lower socioeconomic status, compared to individuals 
with higher socioeconomic status. However, it is more likely for an individual living in any 
other country to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity 
if they have higher socioeconomic status, compared to individuals with lower socioeconomic 
status. Therefore, whether or not individuals with lower socioeconomic status feel that 
immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity is conditional upon the 
welfare spending of their country. The results of the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ outcome is 
thus in accordance with hypothesis 3b. Individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more 
likely to feel that welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity than are individuals with 
higher socioeconomic status, if they live in a country with low social spending. 
 In Model 6, the coefficient of the interaction variable for the ‘conditional upon 
citizenship’ outcome, is positive and statistically significant, showing an increase in the logged 
odds of .137 per one-unit increase in socioeconomic status, if an individual lives in a country 
with low social spending. Margins plot 7c over the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome in 
Graph 7 shows this relationship. For the very lowest socioeconomic category measured by 
‘living on income’, there is no statistically significant variation between individuals living in 
countries with low social spending and individuals living in any other country, in regard to 
whether or not they are more likely to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be 
conditional upon citizenship. As socioeconomic status increases, however, the probability of 
falling into the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome increase at a higher rate if an individual 
lives in a country with low social spending compared to if they live in any other country. 
However, the slope for countries with high spending and the slope for other countries are both 
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positive. Regardless of social spending, higher socioeconomic status increases the probability 
an individual feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship. 
Thus, although the strength of the effect of socioeconomic status is conditional upon social 
spending, whether or not it is more likely for individuals with lower socioeconomic status to 
feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, is not. Instead, 
the results of margins plot 7c, show that whether there is a difference between an individual 
living in a country with low social spending and an individual living in any other country, on 
the likelihood of feeling that immigrant’s access should be conditional upon citizenship, 
depends on their socioeconomic status. For individuals with the lowest socioeconomic status, 
there is no difference between countries with low social spending and all others. As 
socioeconomic status increases, it is more likely for an individual from a country with low 
social spending to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon 
citizenship’, compared to the likelihood of individuals with the same socioeconomic status 
living in any other country.   
 Finally, the coefficient for the ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome in Model 6 is 
not statistically significant. The corresponding margins plot, 7d, show that it is less likely for 
individuals living in countries with low social spending to feel like immigrants should be 
excluded from welfare compared to granting them unconditional access to welfare than it is for 
individuals who live in any other country. As socioeconomic status increases, the probability 
of feeling that immigrants should be excluded from welfare decreases. However, these two 
effects do not interact, and the margins plot does not indicate that the effect of socioeconomic 
status on the probability of falling into the ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome is conditional 
upon social spending. Yet, the results of margins plot 7d over ‘exclusion from welfare’ does 
have some implications for hypothesis 2, which stated that it is more likely for individuals living 
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in countries with higher social spending to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than it is for 
individuals living in countries with lower social spending. Margins plot 6d, above, which 
measures the interaction between socioeconomic status and high social spending, indicate that 
it is more likely that individuals living in countries with high social spending to feel that 
immigrants should be excluded from welfare, compared to individuals living in any other 
country. Similarly, margins plot 7d indicates that is it less likely for individuals living in 
countries with low social spending to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare 
than it is for individuals living in any other country. The difference in probability is slight but 
statistically significant for all values of socioeconomic status, except the lowest. The results of 
margins plot 7d in considered with the results of hypothesis 2 in the ‘Discussion’ section below.  
 I hypothesized that whether individuals with higher socioeconomic status are 
more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with lower socioeconomic 
status, is conditional on the social spending of their country: in countries with low welfare 
spending individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes. Only the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ outcome support this.  For this 
outcome alone, the results of the margins plot indicate that individuals who have low 
socioeconomic status are more likely to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be 
conditional upon reciprocity than individuals with higher socioeconomic status are, if they live 
in a country with low social spending. In contrast, for the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ 
outcome, Model 6 and the corresponding margins plot shows that compared to individuals 
living in other countries, individuals living in countries with low social spending and who have 
higher socioeconomic status are more likely to feel that immigrants’ access should be 
conditional upon citizenship, than individuals with lower socioeconomic status are. Although 
this indicates that the effect of socioeconomic status is dependent on social spending, it does 
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not indicate that the direction of that effect is dependent on social spending. Regardless of social 
spending, increasing socioeconomic status increases the probability of feeling that immigrants’ 
access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship. Also, in contrast to hypothesis 3b, 
individuals living in countries with low social spending are more likely to feel that immigrants’ 
access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship if they have higher socioeconomic 
status, compared to individuals with lower socioeconomic status.  
 I cannot, therefore, accept hypothesis 3b. Instead, the results of Model 6 and 
corresponding margins plots indicate a difference between the conditional outcomes which 
would explain the different results of the two outcomes, but which was not covered by the 
theoretical Model on which the hypothesis was based. This is further elaborated on in the 
discussion section below. 
5.3 Control variables 
While the effect of the introduction of control variables have been discussed in their relation to 
the independent variables, this section offers an analysis of the effect of the control variables 
on welfare chauvinism, in their own right.  
 The variable that measures the percentage of foreign-born population is 
introduced as it represents one of the main alternative theories of what causes variation in 
welfare chauvinistic attitudes across individuals. Some research has suggested that increased 
immigration leads to less support for public welfare in general, because of an increase in cultural 
heterogeneity (Alesina & Glaeser 2004), while others have found the link between increased 
immigration to be non-existent or conditional upon some other factor (Breznau & Eger 2016; 
Brady & Finnigan 2014; Soroka et al. 2015; Vadlamannati 2020). In this study, the result of the 
variable measuring percentage of foreign-born population shows coefficients that are 
statistically significant across all models and outcomes of the dependent variable, indicating 
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that there is indeed a relationship between this variable and welfare chauvinism. The 
coefficients are also consistently negative, meaning that as the percentage of the foreign-born 
population increases, the logged odds of falling into any of the welfare chauvinistic outcomes, 
as compared to the non welfare chauvinistic baseline outcome, decreases. This contradicts the 
theory of cultural and ethnic heterogeneity, stating that increased heterogeneity would increase 
welfare chauvinistic attitudes. The results instead show that the percentage of foreign-born 
population increases, welfare chauvinistic attitudes become less likely.  
 As the main competing theory on what affects the variation in welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes across countries, it is relevant to see what would happen to the full models 
including the interaction variables if the measure for percentage of foreign-born population was 
excluded. When excluding foreign-born population from the models, the interaction variable 
for high social spending reports a statistically significant coefficient for the ‘conditional upon 
citizenship’.6 The change in statistical significance indicate that the interaction term is closely 
associated with the variable measuring foreign-born population. While this does not affect the 
results of this study, it may have implications for future research.   
The remaining control variables behave mostly in the way as expected. First, the 
second competing theory found in the literature is one of a perception that immigrants pose a 
threat to the native culture of the receiving country (Lucassen & Lubbers 2012, p.549). To 
control for this, a variable measuring the perception of immigration as a cultural threat is 
included. The coefficients for this control variable are positive and statistically significant 
across all models and outcomes of the dependent variable. Thus, increasing feelings of 
immigration undermining the cultural life of the country, increase the logged odds of falling 
into one of the welfare chauvinistic outcomes as compared to the ‘Unconditional access’ 
 
6 Models excluding % foreign born pop. and analysis of these can be found in the appendix. 
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outcome. Second, the ‘Gender’ variable only reports statistically significant coefficients for the 
‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome where they are positive across all models. As this 
variable is coded 0= Female, 1=Male, this means that being male increases the logged odds of 
feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, as compared 
to feeling that immigrants should be granted unconditional access to welfare. For this outcome 
alone, gender is a predictor. Third, the coefficients of the variable that measures education are 
statistically significant and negative across all models and outcomes of the dependent variable. 
This indicates that as the level of education increases, the logged odds of falling into a welfare 
chauvinistic outcome decreases as compared to the logged odds of falling into the 
‘unconditional access’ outcome. Fourth, the coefficients for the dummy variable measuring if 
a respondent lives in a rural area are statistically significant and positive for the conditional 
outcomes, across all models, but not for the exclusive outcome. Thus, living in a rural area 
increases the likelihood of conditional welfare chauvinistic attitudes but there is no proof that 
it affects exclusive welfare chauvinistic attitudes. The final control variable measured age. The 
coefficients for this variable are positive and statistically significant across all models and 
outcomes of the dependent variable. The effect looks somewhat weak at first glance, but it is 
important to remember that this variable is measured from age 18 to 100. Thus a 10-, 20- or 30-
year increase would have quite the stronger impact on the logged odds of falling into a welfare 
chauvinistic outcome, than would a 1- or 2-year increase. Increasing values of age increases the 
likelihood of having either of the welfare chauvinistic attitudes, compared to the likelihood of 
having no welfare chauvinistic attitude. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
While the results of the multinomial regressions do not find full support for any of the 
hypotheses of this paper, the results nonetheless offer partial support for some hypotheses, show 
some relationships that might have not been expected, as well as contribute to the literature on 
welfare chauvinism.  
6.1 Realistic group conflict theory and socioeconomic status. 
Based on realistic group conflict theory and the literature on how socioeconomic vulnerability 
affects welfare support, I hypothesized that individuals with lower socioeconomic status were 
less likely to have welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals with higher socioeconomic 
status. Realistic group conflict theory suggests that as competition for finite resources increases, 
so does inter-group conflict. However, inter-group collaboration and common goals mitigate 
this effect. Furthermore, based on Lawrence Bobo’s expansion of realistic group conflict 
theory, it is possible that individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to 
perceive immigration as a threat to the status of the in-group. Individuals with lower 
socioeconomic status may be more likely to have inter-group contact with immigrants, as well 
as see welfare as a common goal for both their in-group and migrants, than individuals of higher 
socioeconomic status. The results of testing hypothesis 1 show that it is more likely for 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status to have conditional welfare chauvinistic attitudes, 
than it was for individuals with lower socioeconomic status, compared to the likelihood of 
having no welfare chauvinistic attitude. In contrast, however, the results show that it is less 
likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic status to feel like immigrants should be 
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excluded from welfare entirely, than it is for individuals with lower socioeconomic status, 
compared to the likelihood of having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes. The results for the 
conditional outcomes thus support hypothesis 1, while the results for ‘exclusion from welfare’ 
contradicted it. As such, it is likely that there is a distinction between the exclusionary outcome 
of the dependent variable, and the conditional outcomes.  
 As argued in the literature review, welfare chauvinism can be both nativist and 
(civic) nationalistic. As nativism protects the interest of natives over immigrants regardless of 
how the immigrant may adapt to the society of their new/host country, the ‘exclusive from 
welfare’ outcome corresponds to a nativist attitude. As such, the results could be interpreted as 
it being more likely for individuals with low socioeconomic status to have a nativist attitude 
towards immigrants’ access to welfare, compared to no welfare chauvinist attitudes, than it is 
for individuals with higher socioeconomic status. With that said though, multinomial logistic 
regression does not allow for interpretation across all outcomes. That is, the results do not show 
if it is more likely for an individual of low socioeconomic status to be more likely to have 
conditional welfare chauvinistic attitudes than an exclusionary attitude. They do, however, 
suggest that there is an underlying reason as to why the effect of socioeconomic status differ 
between the conditional outcomes and the exclusive outcome. The results of this study and the 
research behind it offers no explanation of this division, but future research should focus on the 
distinction between nativism and nationalism when it comes to welfare chauvinistic attitudes.   
6.2 The cost-bearing factor and social spending 
Models 1 and 4, without control variables, seem to lend some support for hypothesis 2: that 
individuals who live in countries with high social spending are be more likely to have stronger 
welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals living in countries with low social spending, at 
least for the ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcome. However, when control variables are 
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introduced, the results show a reversed relationship. For the conditional outcomes, the model 
including the dummy for high social spending show negative coefficients, meaning that it is 
more likely for an individual living in a country with high social spending to feel that 
immigrants’ access to welfare should be unconditional, compared to feeling that it should be 
conditional upon reciprocity or citizenship than it is for individuals living in any other country. 
The model which includes the dummy variable for low social spending reports positive 
coefficients for the variable in all outcomes of the dependent variable. Thus, it is more likely 
for individuals living in high spending countries than low spending countries, to feel like 
immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional rather than unconditional. As the model 
measuring countries with high social spending does not report a statistical value for ‘exclusion 
from welfare’, the only conclusion to be made about this outcome is that it is more likely for 
individuals living in countries with low social spending to feel like immigrants should be 
excluded from welfare, compared to the likelihood of feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare 
should be unconditional, than it is for individuals living in any other country.   
However, some contradicting results are found in the margins plots over the 
interaction variables over both socioeconomic status and high social spending, as well as 
socioeconomic status and low social spending. Graph 6d indicates that it is more likely for 
individuals living in a country with high social spending to feel that immigrants should be 
excluded from welfare than it is for individuals living in any other country. Following the same 
relationship, graph 7d indicated that it is less likely for individuals living in countries with low 
social spending to feel that immigrants should be excluded from welfare than is it for 
individuals living in any other countries. As such, the results of margins plots 6d and 7d indicate 
that it is more likely for individuals living in countries with higher social spending to feel that 
immigrants should be excluded from welfare than it is for individuals living in countries with 
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lower social spending. However, the margins plots report the probability of an outcome 
irrespective of the baseline. Thus, the results of margins plot 6d and 7d are not in comparison 
to having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes. They are a comparison of the individuals who feel 
that immigrants should be excluded from welfare. For those individuals, it is more likely that 
they live in countries with higher social spending, compared to the likelihood of living in 
countries with lower social spending. Thus, the results of testing hypothesis 2 in Models 2 and 
5 still hold up: it is more likely for individuals living in countries with lower social spending to 
have welfare chauvinistic attitudes, compared to the likelihood of having no welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes, than it is for individuals living in countries with higher social spending. 
But the results from the margins plots for ‘exclusion from welfare’ based on Model 3 and 6 add 
support for the conclusion that future research need to define different types of welfare 
chauvinism within the concept of nativism contra (civic) nationalism, to explain the effect of 
socioeconomic status and social spending on welfare chauvinism. 
The results of testing hypothesis 2 were surprising in light of the research behind 
the cost-bearing factor. Only Van Der Waal et al.’s study found similar results to those of this 
study. Following Esping-Andersen’s typology of the welfare state, Van Der Waal et al. found 
that individuals of social democratic countries are on average less likely to display welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes, than are those of liberal or conservative countries (Van Der Waal et al. 
2013). However, as shown by Graph 1, Finland is the only social democratic country that falls 
into the group of countries with high social spending. Thus, being a country with a social 
democratic regime cannot explain the results of this study. 
One possibility to explain these unexpected results, linked to realistic group 
conflict theory, is that in countries with lower social spending there is simply less welfare as a 
resource which increases the competition of it, making individuals in these countries less 
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willing to extend welfare to immigrants. Another explanation is that the studies that supported 
the cost-bearing factor, did not accurately measure the effect of social spending on welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes. One study used Esping-Anderson’s typology to gauge the effect of social 
spending on the arguments of PRRPs (Ennser-Jedenastik 2018). The other combined the effect 
of refugee flows with social spending on the support for PRRPs over time and argued that since 
increased refugee flows had a higher effect on the support for PRRPs in countries with high 
social spending, this was an effect of welfare chauvinism (Vadlamannati 2020). Furthermore, 
researchers have found that the economic policies of PRRPs differ between parties and 
countries (see Mudde 2007; Afonso 2015 Schumacher Kersbergen 2014; Krause & Giebler 
2020). Others have suggested that differences in the political systems of countries affect both 
the rise of PRRP and what type of politics they might pursue (Golder 2016). In the purpose of 
this paper, I aimed to offer a plausible explanation as to why countries with high social 
spending, which once seemed unlikely to have support for PRRP, now do. Unfortunately, the 
results of this study offer no such explanations. Rather, they explain why welfare chauvinism 
is more common in countries with low social spending. However, the results of this paper 
combined with the discussion of the literature above, suggest that welfare chauvinism might 
not always translate into votes for PRRP. Thus, future research could focus on the effect of 
individual welfare chauvinistic attitudes on PRRP voting, depending on what type of welfare 
system the country they’re based in have.  
6.3 An interacting effect?  
For the last set of hypotheses, based on the mixed results of previous research of both 
socioeconomic status’ and welfare spending’s effect on welfare chauvinism, I posed the 
possibility of the effect of socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism being conditional upon 
social spending. To gauge this effect, I introduced two interaction variables: one measuring 
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socioeconomic status and high social spending, and one measuring socioeconomic status and 
low social spending. The introduction of these two variables in Model 3 and 6 yielded very few 
statistically significant results. Model 3 tested hypothesis 3a: Whether individuals with higher 
socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than individuals 
with lower socioeconomic status, is conditional on the welfare-spending of their country: in 
countries with high welfare spending individuals with higher income are more likely to display 
welfare chauvinistic attitudes. The Model reports no statistically significant coefficients for the 
interaction term. Furthermore, the margins plot based on Model 3 do not indicate that whether 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes is conditional upon the welfare spending of their country. Therefore, no support for 
hypothesis 3a is found. The results of hypothesis 2 indicates that the cost-bearing factor is not 
a predictor of welfare chauvinism. Living in a country with high social spending does not 
increase the likelihood of welfare chauvinistic attitudes. In light of those results, the lack of 
proof for hypothesis 3a is not surprising.  However, the results of the variable measuring 
percentage of foreign-born population, indicate that this variable affect the interaction between 
socioeconomic status and high social spending. Thus, future research should look at this 
association to see how levels of immigration in high spending countries may affect how 
socioeconomic status influence welfare chauvinistic attitudes.  
Hypothesis 3b stated that in countries with low social spending, individuals with 
lower socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare chauvinistic attitudes than 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status. In the models and margins plots testing this 
hypothesis, some statistically significant results are found in the conditional outcomes. 
‘Conditional upon reciprocity’ was the only outcome in where the interaction variable indicates 
that whether individuals with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to display welfare 
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chauvinistic outcomes is conditional upon the social spending of their country. The results show 
that in countries with low social spending, individuals with lower socioeconomic status are 
more likely to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity, 
compared to feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare should be unconditional, than are 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status. For all other countries, the relationship is 
reversed. As such, the ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ outcome alone support hypothesis 3b.  
The results of the ‘Conditional upon citizenship’ outcome in Model 6 and the 
corresponding margins plot show that the effect of socioeconomic status is conditional upon 
social spending. However, whether individuals of lower socioeconomic status are more likely 
to feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship than 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status, is not conditional upon the social spending of 
their country. As such, the results did not support hypothesis 3b. Furthermore, the results also 
contradicted the direction of the relationship stated by the hypothesis. Individuals with higher 
socioeconomic status were more likely to feel like immigrants’ access to welfare should be 
conditional upon citizenship than were individuals of lower socioeconomic status.  
Once again, the lack of support for hypothesis 2 and that the cost-bearing factor 
does not seem to be a predictor for welfare chauvinism, may explain why there is no support 
for hypothesis 3b. However, although the results cannot confirm hypothesis 3b, the results from 
testing it still yield two important take-aways. First, socioeconomic status and low social 
spending interact with each other, affecting the probability of an individual having a welfare 
chauvinistic attitude. Although only ‘conditional upon reciprocity’ indicated support for 
hypothesis 3b, the results of ‘conditional upon citizenship’ show that the differences between 
countries depend on what level of socioeconomic status individuals have. Thus, while the 
results of the interaction variable for socioeconomic status and low social spending on the 
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‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome, do not support hypothesis 3b, they still offer an 
explanation as to what extent social spending affect the relationship between socioeconomic 
status and social spending. The effect of social spending on the relationship between 
socioeconomic status and feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon 
citizenship is higher in countries with low social spending, compared to all other countries.  
Second, so far, I have suggested that there is something unique with the ‘exclusion 
from welfare’ outcome compared to the conditional outcomes, which would explain why the 
effects of different variables contrast for this outcome, across several different Models. I have 
argued that ‘exclusion from welfare’ correlates with nativist arguments, while ‘conditional 
upon citizenship’ correlates with (civic) nationalist arguments. But how and where does 
‘conditional upon reciprocity’ fit in? What makes an individual have one welfare chauvinistic 
attitude over another? The lack of answers to these questions show that the results of testing 
hypothesis 3b indicate that future research should carefully evaluate different types of welfare 
chauvinism.
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper was to add to the discussion in the literature about the effects of both 
socioeconomic status and social spending, as well as offer a plausible explanation PRRP’s 
success in countries with high social spending, over the past few decades. To do so, three 
research questions were asked. The first question asked what effect socioeconomic status has 
on welfare chauvinistic attitudes. The results of the study show that in comparison to having no 
welfare chauvinistic attitudes, individuals with higher socioeconomic status were more likely 
than individuals with lower socioeconomic status, to have conditionally welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes, but not exclusionary welfare chauvinistic attitudes. Thus, the effect of socioeconomic 
status on welfare chauvinistic attitudes depends on the attitude measured. It is more likely for 
persons with higher socioeconomic status to have conditionally welfare chauvinistic attitudes 
compared to having no welfare chauvinistic attitudes than it is for individuals with low 
socioeconomic status. However, it is more likely for persons with lower socioeconomic status 
to have exclusive welfare chauvinistic attitudes compared to having no welfare chauvinistic 
attitudes than it is for individuals with higher socioeconomic status.  
 The second research question asked how social spending in European countries 
affect welfare chauvinistic attitudes. While hypothesis 2 suggested that high social spending 
would increase the likelihood of an individual having welfare chauvinistic attitudes, the results 
of this study showed a reversed relationship. High social spending decreases the likelihood of 
individuals having welfare chauvinistic attitudes, while low social spending increases the 
likelihood of individuals having welfare chauvinistic attitudes. However, a discrepancy is found 
for exclusive chauvinistic attitudes; where of the individuals who feel that immigrants’ should 
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be excluded from welfare, it is more likely that they live in countries with higher social spending 
than in countries with lower social spending.  
Finally, the third research question considered to what extent a European 
country’s social spending affect the relationship between its residents’ socioeconomic status 
and welfare chauvinism? Based on varying results in the literature on how socioeconomic status 
and social spending affects welfare chauvinism, I posed that these two factors might interact 
with each other. The results show that while low social spending and socioeconomic status 
interact, they find no proof that high social spending and socioeconomic status do. The results 
of the interaction between low social spending and socioeconomic status also differs between 
the welfare chauvinistic attitudes. It is less likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic 
status than individuals with lower socioeconomic status, to feel like immigrants’ access to 
welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity if they live in a country with low social spending. 
However, for individuals living in any other country it is more likely for individuals with higher 
socioeconomic status than individuals with lower socioeconomic status to feel like immigrants’ 
access to welfare should be conditional upon reciprocity. As such, both the effect of 
socioeconomic status on welfare chauvinism and the direction of that relationship is conditional 
upon social spending.  In contrast, the effect of social spending on the feeling that immigrants’ 
access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, is conditional upon socioeconomic 
status. The results show that individuals with low socioeconomic status have the same 
probability of feeling that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, 
regardless of the social spending of their country. For individuals with higher socioeconomic 
status, however, it is more likely for individuals living in countries with low social spending to 
feel that immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship, than it is for 
individuals with the same socioeconomic status living in any other country. In conclusion, 
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socioeconomic status and low social spending affect each other’s effect on the conditional 
welfare chauvinistic attitudes, but which factor is conditional upon the other, varies between 
the two attitudes.  
 The results of this paper gave a few options for future research. First, although 
this thesis finds limited proof that an interaction between socioeconomic status and social 
spending would explain the varying results from previous research on these to predictors for 
welfare chauvinism, the results point at a different underlying factor which may account for 
this previous variation. The differentiating results of the variables of this study across the 
outcomes of welfare chauvinism suggest that there’s a need for future research to provide a 
distinction between different welfare chauvinistic attitudes. Specifically, both socioeconomic 
status and social spending had different effects on the welfare chauvinistic attitudes that may 
be considered (civic) nationalistic, and the welfare chauvinistic attitudes that may be considered 
nativist.  As such, future research should look at factors that may predict what type of welfare 
chauvinistic attitude an individual might have. Furthermore, the results of this study indicate 
that future studies on welfare chauvinism need to account for the division between nativist and 
nationalistic welfare chauvinistic attitudes, regardless of what predictors are being looked at.  
 Second, the results provide a possible way to evaluate the support for PRRP in 
countries with high social spending. As stated above, a part of the aim of this paper was to 
provide a plausible reason for PRRP support in high spending countries. Unfortunately, the 
results offer no such explanation. However, the results combined with previous research on 
PRRPs offers a new possibility that would be of value for future research to examine. The 
economic policies of PRRPs are known to vary between parties and countries (Mudde 2004, 
2007). Some researchers have also found that the political system of the country of the PRRP 
may influence what type of arguments PRRP use and how successful they are (Golder 2016). 
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Thus, it is possible that welfare chauvinistic attitudes do not always translate into support for 
PRRP. While welfare chauvinistic attitudes may not be more common in countries with high 
social spending, there is a possibility that they are a better predictor for PRRP support in 
countries with higher social spending, compared to countries with lower social spending.  
Future research should therefore evaluate the possible variation in how welfare chauvinism 





Table A 1. Variable list 
  Variable list Question asked 
 (1) Welfare chauvinism  Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you 
think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens 
already living here? Please choose the option on this card that comes closest to your 
view.  
 
 (2) Living on income Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your 
household’s income nowadays? 
 
 (3) Low social spending Represents the 25% of countries included in this study, which spend the least on 
social welfare.  
 (4) High social spending Represents the 25% of countries included in this study, which spend the most on 
social welfare. 
 (5) % foreign-born pop Country-level variable measuring percentage of population born in other country.  
 (6) Immgr. Impct. cult … would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched 
by people coming to live here from other countries?  
 (9) Gender Sex? (Male/Female) 
 (10) Education What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed? (ISCED 
coded) 
 (11) Rural dummy Which phrase […] best describes the area where you live? 































Table A 2. Mean estimation table 
Number of obs   =     34,127  
 
Source: ESS8, weighted data 
   Mean St.Dv 
Welfare Chauvinism   










   
Living on current 
income 
3.14 .80 
   
Social spending (High)  .41 
Other .79  
High .21  
   
Social spending (Low)  .45 
Other .72  
Low .28  
   
% Foreign born 
population 
11.67 4.34 




   
Gender  .50 
Female .51  
Male .49  
   
Education 3.78 1.90 
   
Living in rural area  .49 
Urban .61  
Rural .39  
   
Age 49.39 18.04 





High  .66 1.31 
Other 2.46 1.48 





Low .87 1.46 








Table A 3. Tabulation of Welfare chauvinism 
Should immigrants gain access to welfare? Freq. Percent Cum. 
Unconditional access 6680 19.57 19.57 
Conditional upon reciprocity 16238 47.58 67.16 
Conditional upon Citizenship 8829 25.87 93.03 
Exclusion from welfare 2380 6.97 100.00 
Total 34127 100.00  
Source: ESS8, Weighted data 
 
Table A 4. Tabulation of Living on Income 
 Feeling about living on household's income nowadays Freq. Percent Cum. 
Very difficult 1210 3.55 3.55 
Difficult 4651 13.63 17.18 
Coping on current income 16327 47.84 65.02 
Living comfortably 11938 34.98 100.00 
Total 34127 100.00  
Source: ESS8, Weighted data    
 
 
Table A 5. Crosstabulation of Welfare chauvinism and Living on income when High-spend 
dummy=0(Other) with Chi-square 
Should immigrants gain access to 
welfare? 












Unconditional access 177 588 2224 2297 5286 Freq. 
 20.68 18.63 17.70 22.58 19.76 Percent 
 0.4         2.0        27.0        40.9 70.3 Ch2 cont. 
Conditional upon reciprocity 384 1445 6132 5034 12994 Freq. 
 44.73 45.82 48.82 49.48 48.59 Percent 
 2.6         5.0         2.0         1.7 9.4 Ch2 cont. 
Conditional upon Citizenship 182 812 3408 2478 6879 Freq. 
 21.19 25.73 27.13 24.36 25.72 Percent 
 6.9         0.0         9.7         7.4 23.9 Ch2 cont. 
Exclusion from welfare 1145 310 798 364 1586 Freq. 
 13.40 9.82 6.35 3.58 5.93 Percent 
 80.6        80.3         3.7        95.0 259.6 Ch2 cont. 
Total 857.5108 3154.331 12561.62 10172.54 26746 Freq. 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Percent 
 90.4        87.3        40 144.9 363.3 Ch2 value 
First row has frequencies and second row has column percentages 














Table A 6. Crosstabulation of Welfare chauvinism and Living on income when High-spend 
dummy=1(High) with Chi-Square 
Should immigrants gain access to 
welfare? 












Unconditional access 54 253 621 485 1413 Freq. 
 16.96 19.23 16.88 23.45 19.76 Percent 
 0.8         0.0 9.8 20.0 30.7 Ch2 cont. 
Conditional upon reciprocity 112 555 1731 945 3342 Freq. 
 34.94 42.14 47.04 45.75 13.0 Percent 
 7.5         2.9         2.5         0.1 9.4 Ch2 cont. 
Conditional upon Citizenship 78 312 1,026 519 6879 Freq. 
 24.38 23.71 27.87 25.13 26.21 Percent 
 0.4         3.1         3.9         0.9 8.4 Ch2 cont. 
Exclusion from welfare 76 197 302 117 691 Freq. 
 23.73 14.93 8.20 5.67 9.37 Percent 
 70.3        43.5         5.3        30.2 149.3 Ch2 cont. 
Total 319 1316 3679 2066 7381 Freq. 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Percent 
 79.1        49.5        21.5 51.2 201.3 Ch2 value 
First row has frequencies and second row has column percentages 





Table A 7. Crosstabulation of Welfare chauvinism and Living on income when Low-spend 
dummy=0(Others) with Chi-square 
Should immigrants gain access to 
welfare? 












Unconditional access 174 648. 2098 1926 4846 Freq. 
 19.45 18.84 17.48 23.13 19.65 Percent 
 0.0         1.1        28.8        51.5      81.4 Ch2 cont. 
Conditional upon reciprocity 3667 1527 5821 4118 11833 Freq. 
 41.00 44.38 48.51 49.45 47.98 Percent 
 9.1         9.3         0.7               3.8 22.8 Ch2 cont. 
Conditional upon Citizenship 199 849 3235 1924 6207 Freq. 
 22.25 24.67 26.96 23.11 25.17 Percent 
 3.0         0.3        15.3        14.1        32.7 Ch2 cont. 
Exclusion from welfare 155 417 847 359 1777 Freq. 
 17.31 12.11 7.06 4.31 7.21 Percent 
 126.6       115.0         0.4             97.0 339.0 Ch2 cont. 
Total 894.7458 3440.911 12001.52 8326.82 24664 Freq. 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Percent 
 138.8       125.8        45.2       166.3 476.0 Ch2 value 
First row has frequencies and second row has column percentages 






Table A 8. Crosstabulation of Welfare chauvinism and Living on income when Low-spend 
dummy=1(Low) with Chi-square 
Should immigrants gain access to 
welfare? 














Unconditional access 40 176 601 946 1763 Freq. 
 16.69 19.35 16.85 19.94 18.63 Percent 
 0.5         0.2         6.1         4.3 11.2 Chi2 cont. 
Conditional upon reciprocity 103 401 1576 1951 4038 Freq. 
 42.99 43.97 44.20 41.25 42.67 Percent 
 0.0         0.4         2.0         2.2 4.5 Chi2 cont.  
Conditional upon Citizenship 59 270 1210 1736 3275 Freq. 
 24.48 29.60 33.92 36.59 34.60 Percent 
 7.1         6.6         0.5         5.4 19.6 Chi2 value 
Exclusion from welfare 38 64 179 105 387 Freq. 
 15.84 7.08 5.03 2.22 4.09 Percent 
 80.8        19.8         7.7        40.7 149.0 Chi2 cont. 
Total 249 911 3566 474 9463 Freq. 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Percent 
 88.4        27.0        16.2        52.6 184.3 Chi2 value 
  
First row has frequencies and second row has column percentages 
Source: ESS8, Weighted data. Frequencies have been rounded to closest whole number. 
The results of Chi-square shows that when the dummy for high social spending is 0 (Low), Chi-
square= 363.3, and when 1(High), Chisquare=201.3. When the dummy for low social spending 
is 0 (High), Chi-square= 476.0, and when 1(Low), Chi-square=184.3. With 9 degrees of 
freedom, all Chi-square values have a corresponding p-value of <.001, meaning that they are 
statistically significant. As such, the null hypothesis saying that the relationship between 
welfare chauvinism and socioeconomic status combined with social spending is actually 0 is 
rejected. While these results alone are encouraging enough to continue with hypotheses testing, 
one more aspect of the results of the Chi-square test is noteworthy. An advantage of using the 
Chi2 to analyze a controlled tabulation is that one can analyze how different outcomes 
contribute to the Chi-square total, and thus to statistical significance (Pollock & Edwards 2020 
p.138). Interestingly, of the outcomes of the dependent variable, the ‘exclusion from welfare’ 
outcome, which graph 1 showed to have the least percentage of observations, contributes the 




spending, and all categories except ‘coping on current income’ of the variable measuring 
socioeconomic status. This suggests that the strongest relationship between socioeconomic 
status combined with social spending, and welfare chauvinism is in the strongest welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes of the dependent variable. Other outcomes of the dependent variable 
contribute in variation to the Chi-square value, although none as much as the ‘exclusion from 
welfare’. Regardless, the Chi-square results and corresponding p-values supports the 






Table A 9. Bivariate Models 




    A1 A2 A3   A4     A5 A6     A7   A8    A9    
Unconditional 
access 
Baseline          
Con. 
Reciprocity 
 Living on inc. -.061** 
(.028) 
        
 High social spending  -.05 
(.046) 
       
 Low social spending   -.045 
(.046) 
      
 % Foreign born pop.    -.029*** 
(.003) 
     
 Immigr. Impact culture     .069***     
        (.01)     
             
 Gender      -.005    
         (.041)    
 Education       -.125***   
          (.011)   
 Living in rural area        .164***  
           (.043)  
 Age         .009*** 
            (.001) 
 Constant 1.097*** .916*** .904*** 1.261*** .577*** .904*** 1.415*** .842*** .459*** 
    (.092) (.024) (.022) (.047) (.048) (.028) (.051) (.026) (.06) 
Con.  
Citizenship 
Living on income -.122*** 
(.03) 
        
 High social spending  .032 
(.05) 
       
 Low social spending   .387*** 
(.05) 
      
 % Foreign born pop.    -.094*** 
(.004) 
     
 Immigr. Impact culture     .108***     
        (.01)     





 Gender      .109**    
         (.045)    
 Education       -.146***   
          (.012)   
 Living in rural area        .288***  
           (.046)  
 Age         .011*** 
            (.001) 
 Constant .7*** .301*** .279*** 1.411*** -.214*** .258*** .904*** .203*** -.246*** 
    (.098) (.026) (.024) (.056) (.052) (.031) (.055) (.028) (.067) 
Exclusion  Living on income -.618***         
From welfare  (.039)         
 High social spending  .419***        
   (.068)        
 Low social spending   -.419***       
    (.076)       
 % Foreign born pop.    -.118***      
       (.006)      
 Immigr. Impact culture     .403***     
        (.013)     
             
 Gender      -.046    
         (.064)    
 Education       -.423***   
          (.018)   
 Living in rural area        .241***  
           (.065)  
 Age         .019*** 
            (.002) 
 Constant .898*** -1.11*** -.94*** .389*** -3.353*** -.943*** .556*** -1.054*** -1.92*** 
    (.121) (.038) (.033) (.071) (.088) (.044) (.071) (.041) (.099) 
  Observations 34127 34127 34127 34127 34127 34127 34127 34127 34127 
  Pseudo R2 .006 .001 .001 .01 .026 0 .013 .001 .003 
    




Table A 10. Excluded control variables 
Welfare chauvinism       Model   Model 
outcomes        A10    A11 
Unconditional access Baseline   
      
Conditional upon  Living on income -.012 -.083*** 
Reciprocity     (.03) (.029) 
  High soc. spending -.101**  
    (.047)  
  Low soc. spending  -.029 
     (.047) 
 % Foreign born-pop   
    
 Immigr. Imact culture   
    
  Source on income 
(baseline paid work) 
  
      
  Pension .019 .064 
    (.056) (.056) 
  Social benefits -.372*** -.289*** 
    (.095) (.095) 
  Savings or investments .113 .087 
    (.247) (.249) 
  Gender -.001 .005 
    (.041) (.041) 
  Education -.117***  
    (.012)  
  Living in rural area .1** .149*** 
    (.044) (.043) 
  Age .006*** .007*** 
    (.002) (.001) 
  Constant 1.137*** .735*** 
    (.126) (.118) 
Conditional upon  Living on income -.07** -.161*** 
Citizenship    (.032) (.031) 
  High soc. spending -.041  
    (.051)  
  Low soc. spending  .421*** 
     (.051) 
 % Foreign born-pop   
    
 Immigr. Imact culture   
    
  Source on income 
(baseline paid work) 
  
      
  Pension .102* .166*** 
    (.061) (.061) 
  Social benefits -.365*** -.322*** 
    (.106) (.106) 
  Savings or investments .102 .082 
    (.265) (.268) 
  Gender .119*** .128*** 
    (.045) (.045) 
  Education -.121***  
    (.013)  
  Living in rural area .214*** .254*** 




  Age .007*** .008*** 
    (.002) (.002) 
  Constant .553*** .189 
    (.136) (.128) 
Exclusion from   Living on income -.431*** -.64*** 
Welfare     (.044) (.042) 
  High soc. spending .221***  
    (.07)  
  Low soc. spending  -.291*** 
     (.078) 
 % Foreign born-pop   
    
 Immigr. Imact culture   
    
  Source on income 
(baseline paid work) 
  
      
  Pension .082 .223*** 
    (.086) (.084) 
  Social benefits -.452*** -.267* 
    (.146) (.149) 
  Savings or investments .399 .298 
    (.403) (.404) 
  Gender .024 .021 
    (.065) (.065) 
  Education -.347***  
    (.02)  
  Living in rural area .076 .225*** 
    (.067) (.066) 
  Age .008*** .015*** 
    (.002) (.002) 
  Constant 1.066*** .061 
    (.182) (.17) 
  Observations 34127 34127 
  Pseudo R2 .019 .012 
 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses  *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1, Source: ESS8, weighted data 
 
The differentiating results between the Models 1 and 3 and Models 2 and 5 suggest that one or 
several of the control variables explain the effect social spending as a predictor for welfare 
chauvinism. After running all control variables separately in bivariate regressions with the 
dependent variable (see table A9), the results showed that ‘percentage of foreign-born 
population’, ‘immigration’s impact on cultural life’ and ‘education’ had the largest effect on 
Pseudo R2. Pseudo R2 is does not show the variation in the dependent explained by a Model, in 
the same way R2 does. Instead, it is a measure of how much better the Model predicts the 




same outcome. The relatively high R2 of the three control variables listed above, thus indicate 
a superior predictive power. Therefore, there is the possibility of one or more of them explaining 
the effect of the dummy variables for social spending.  Because of this, I tried excluding and 
including these variables from the regression to see if either or several could be the explanation 
for the changed coefficient social spending in the multivariate Models, as compared to the 
bivariate Models (see table A10). After testing several different combinations for high social 
spending and low social spending respectively, it became clear that when either ‘percentage of 
foreign-born population’ or ‘immigration’s impact on cultural life’ were included in the 
Models, they had the effect of changing the direction of the coefficients of the dummy for high 
social spending in the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ and ‘exclusion from welfare’ outcomes. 
Thus, when either control is accounted for, living in a country with high social spending 
decreases the risk of falling into one of the welfare chauvinistic outcomes, and increases the 
risk of falling into the ‘unconditional access’ outcome.  
 Introducing either of the three variables, ‘percentage of foreign-born population’, 
‘immigration’s impact on cultural life’ or ‘education’ in the Models with the dummy for low 
social spending have the effect of changing the coefficient of the low spending dummy, from 
negative to positive. The coefficient for ‘conditional upon citizenship’ remains positive and 
statistically significant through all variations. These results show that when either of the three 
control variables are accounted for, living in a country with low social spending increases the 
likelihood of falling into one of the welfare chauvinistic outcomes, and decreases the risk of 








Table A 11. Interaction Models without % Foreign-born population 
Welfare chauvinism      Model   Model 
outcomes     A12 A13 
Unconditional access Baseline outcome   
      
Conditional upon Living on income .005 .042 
Reciprocity     (.034) (.031) 
 High social Spending -.361*  
    (.198)  
 Low social spending  .277 
     (.203) 
 % Foreign born pop.   
      
 Immigr. Impact culture .056*** .055*** 
    (.01) (.01) 
 Gender -.01 -.009 
    (.041) (.041) 
 Education -.105*** -.105*** 
    (.012) (.012) 
 Living in rural area .108** .104** 
    (.043) (.043) 
 Age .007*** .007*** 
    (.001) (.001) 





      




      
 Constant  .729*** .584*** 
    (.145) (.136) 
Conditional upon Living on income -.053 -.035 
Citizenship    (.037) (.034) 
 High soc. Spending -.424**  
    (.213)  
 Low soc. spending  .07 
     (.223) 
 % Foreign born pop.   
      
 Immigr. Impact culture .092*** .094*** 
    (.01) (.01) 
 Gender .104** .109** 
    (.045) (.045) 
 Education -.106*** -.106*** 
    (.013) (.013) 
 Living in rural area .22*** .203*** 
    (.047) (.047) 
 Age .009*** .009*** 
    (.001) (.001) 





      




      
 Constant  -.08 -.204 
    (.156) (.147) 
Exclusion from  Living on income -.291*** -.27*** 




 High soc. Spending -.146  
    (.272)  
 Low soc. spending  .298 
     (.279) 
 % Foreign born pop.   
      
 Immigr. Impact culture .378*** .379*** 
     (.014) (.014) 
 Gender -.041 -.04 
    (.067) (.068) 
 Education -.317*** -.319*** 
    (.021) (.021) 
 Living in rural area .065 .069 
    (.07) (.07) 
 Age .01*** .01*** 
    (.002) (.002) 
 Living on income*High 
soc. spending 
.062  
    (.091)  
 Living on income*Low 
soc. spending 
 -.107 
     (.092) 
 Constant  -1.732*** -1.79*** 
    (.224) (.212) 
  Observations 34127 34127 
  Pseudo R2 .039 .04 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses  *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1, Source: ESS8, weighted data 
As shown by Model 1 in Table A11, excluding the control variable from the Model measuring 
the interaction between socioeconomic status and low social spending did not have any 
significant effect. However, as shown by Model 2 in Table A11, excluding it from the Model 
measuring the interaction between socioeconomic status and high social spending produced a 
statistically significant coefficient for the ‘conditional upon citizenship’ outcome. Table A12 
shows the margins plot over ‘conditional upon citizenship, which illustrates the interaction 
between socioeconomic status and high social spending reported for this outcome in Model 2 




Table A 12. Margins plot 'Exclusion from welfare', without foreign-born pop. 
 
Source: ESS8, weighted data 
When the variable measuring percentage of foreign-born population is excluded, the effect of 
variating socioeconomic status on ‘conditional upon citizenship’ is dependent on whether or 
not an individual lives in a country with high social spending or in any other country. In 
countries with high social spending, it is more likely for individuals with higher socioeconomic 
status to feel like immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon citizenship rather 
than without conditions, than it is for individuals with lower socioeconomic status. The opposite 
relationship can be observed in all other countries: it is more likely for individuals with lower 
socioeconomic status to feel like immigrants’ access to welfare should be conditional upon 
citizenship rather than without conditions, than it is for individuals with higher socioeconomic 
status. As such, the results of Model 1 in table A11 would have given some support for 
hypothesis 3a: in countries with high social spending, it is more likely for individuals with 
higher socioeconomic status to have welfare chauvinistic attitudes, than individuals with lower 
socioeconomic status. Thus, the results indicate that the effect of the interaction between 
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